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Introduction
The Portuguese health system has made progress in providing better health ser-
vices to the whole population, specially in the last two decades. Real improvements
range from rearrangements of the health care network to specific programs that
aim at solving a given downside in the system. Factors aside the health care pro-
vision, such as legislation on health and the ways of payment to health providers,
which might influence health care, are as much important to determine the quan-
tity and quality of the health system as the provided care. For that reason, they
also changed in one or another direction to give right incentives for provision of
health care.
This dissertation consolidates the results and conclusions from three empirical
studies in the field of health economics. It is composed by three essays that evaluate
major recent reforms implemented in Portugal to raise quality on its health care
system. Together, they also offer an wide and updated analysis of the services
provided though the Portuguese national health service (NHS).
Since the beginning of the new century, a relative big number of health reform
initiatives were implemented, covering five areas of intervention: health promotion,
long-term care, primary and ambulatory care, hospital management and inpatient
care, and the pharmaceutical market.1 The essays carried on in this work assess
changes on health promotion and hospital management and inpatient care.
The need to analyse the impact of hospital merges on quantity and quality of
health services emerged from the unification of some public hospital management
teams and the change to a more entrepreneurial-like status from 2003 onwards,
1Barros P, Machado S, Simões J. 2011. Portugal health system review. European Observatory
on Health Systems and Policies 13(4).
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plus the implementation of a purchaser-provider relation between Government
and hospitals, through contracting. At the same time, some primary care emer-
gency services were closed to better organize the network. In this context, the
first essay, named “The Volume-Outcome Effect in a National Health Service: the
Portuguese Case”, addresses whether a new network distribution of medical pro-
cedures, namely the merge of medical activity of two or more hospital units, can
lead to any social or economic benefit for the population. I found evidence that a
hypothetical alternative arrangement network of the Portuguese public hospitals,
based on economies of scale, for some specific diseases, can lead to health bene-
fits for the population, through the argument of “practice-makes-perfect”, which
claims that the bigger the number of times that a team performs a given medical
procedure, the bigger the rate of success.
The cost of services provided by the public health systems is another variable
under constant scrutiny as for philosophical reasons or for the scarcity of resources
to match demand and supply. In Portugal, as in many European countries, the
payment of a medical procedure performed by a hospital is made by the Gov-
ernment (purchaser) based in the “diagnosis-related group” (DRG) classification.
The price of each DRG, which corresponds to the provided health care, is estab-
lished by the Ministry of Health, with infrequent adjustments, usually to update
costs. Auditing is the most frequent measure used to control the principal-agent
problem. However, this is costly and not always efficient. In such context, the
second essay, “Upcoding in a NHS”, is an analysis of whether the price setting is
or is not inciting upcoding behaviour.2 The results obtained show that upcoding
occurred in the Portuguese NHS, for the investigated DRGs, and a new price set-
ting could discourage such behaviour. The cost of this behaviour was calculated
and is relatively small.
The last essay, “Does it last? Effects from a public policy to recover waiting
lists”, is an evaluation of a direct intervention policy, the ophthalmology inter-
vention programme (PIO), that was active in the years of 2008 and 2009. This
was a health promotion initiative reform. The Ministry of Health defined the
programme following recommendations of the Portuguese National Health Plan
2004-2010. The waiting time and waiting list for eye-related first consultation
2Upcoding is defined as classifying patients in DRG codes associated with larger payments.
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and subsequent medical procedures were far from acceptable and a patient could
wait several months to receive medical care. The main eye-related diagnosis is the
cataract, a medical condition that can reduce drastically the quality of life and
lead to blindness if not adequately treated. In spite of improving the universal
access to this medical treatment, the intervention programme was completed and
post evaluations conducted were mainly descriptive, not considering the random-
ness and the dynamic problems of waiting lists. Therefore, I add to the literature
an economic investigation that consider such problems. I investigated whether the
intervention programme was successful in attaining the goals established and the
conclusion was that size waiting lists and waiting times reduced in a statistically
significant way that allowed me to conclude for the success of the programme. This
evidence may help future investment decisions done by policy makers, regarding
the allocation of public resources in the health care market.
Aggregating these achievements, it is noteworthy that the Portuguese public
health system has been improving since the beginning of the century. Moreover,
the investigated recent reforms adopted corroborate with one of the broad goals
defined in the National Health Plan, namely the promotion of an effective and
efficient health care service.
The decision of these three research questions were not random. On the con-
trary, I tried to establish a very specific pattern, going from a very broad and con-
crete subject (the network arrangement of the health care system), passing through
the regulatory system (the impact of DRG’s price on behaviour of physicians), to
a policy intervention (the ophthalmology programme to reduce waiting lists and
waiting times). Another highlight to make refers to the data. I used medical
records of the Portuguese public hospitals in all three essays, which is another fact
to reinforce the connection among the studies. Depending on the subject, I selected
medical records from 2001 to 2010. The dataset was provided by Administração
Central do Sistema de Saúde (ACSS) that consolidates the information of all Por-
tuguese public hospitals. It is primarily designed for administrative purposes, but
it also has a relevant number of extra-information regarding characteristics of the
patients and medical conditions that allows economic analyses. The advantages
of designing randomized controlled trials or applying specific questionnaires are
counterbalanced by the size of the sample provided by the ACSS, which accounts
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for almost the whole population of Portuguese public medical records. Beside that,
the time required and high estimated cost to build more accurate samples leaded
me to use the already available dataset.
Having information of individuals allowed me to conduct analyses at the spe-
cific level of patient or at a more aggregate level of hospital, for example, when
it is more suitable. Although there is no possibility of tracking patients over the
years, due to confidentiality reasons, I was able to apply the techniques of panel
data when aggregating information across the hospitals. Comparing such tech-
nique with the alternative of cross-section analysis, I was able to measure more
precisely the impact of one variable over another, isolating no-related influences in
the fixed-effects term, an advantage of panel data techniques. Other econometric
tools used include descriptive statistics, instrumental variables and simultaneous
equation models. In any case, the econometric results obtained were used to make
estimations in real terms such as number of deaths avoided, cost in euros and
waiting time in days. Moreover, I always brought the results back to the con-
text in which the samples were extracted to explore the potential benefits of the
conclusions achieved.
The main contribution of the thesis was to provide a broad innovative and
updated economic analysis of the Portuguese public health system and also to
offer a measure of the impact of reform initiatives adopted in the last decade. The
establishment of these results render evidence for new investment decisions in the
public health system. Although there are much work done for the United States
health market as well as for the largest countries of the Commonwealth, the results
does not carry on automatically due to different characteristics of the samples and
the functionality of the health systems. The results offered in this dissertation may
be extended for countries other than Portugal, such as other southern European
countries, that also have NHSs with similar obstacles to overcome.
In terms of local policy implications, the results suggest that hospital merges
should be kept going as specific programs like the PIO are effective to attack
problems such as waiting lists for eye-related surgeries. The combination of higher
investment associated to behavior incentives lead to solutions in the short-term. In
terms of price scheme, the spread of DRG prices, if smaller, could reduce upcoding.
However, the estimated upcoding is not high compared to the global expenditure,
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meaning that the ongoing auditing is enough to avoid large damage in the health
system.
This dissertation is organized into 3 additional chapters. Chapter 2 is the first
essay, “The Volume-Outcome Effect in a National Health Service: the Portuguese
Case”. Chapter 3 presents the second essay, “The Upcdogin in a NHS” and chapter
4 has the third essay of the dissertation, named “Does it last? Effects from a public
policy to recover waiting lists”.
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Chapter 1
Volume-Outcome Effect in a




Evidence in the literature suggests a negative relationship between volume of med-
ical procedures and mortality rates in the health care sector. In general, high-
volume hospitals appear to achieve lower mortality rates, although considerable
variation exists. However, most studies focus on US hospitals, which face different
incentives than hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS). In order to add to
the literature, this study aims to understand what happens in a NHS. Results re-
veal a statistically significant correlation between volume of procedures and better
outcomes for the following medical procedures: cerebral infarction, respiratory in-
fections, circulatory disorders with AMI, bowel procedures, cirrhosis, and hip and
femur procedures. The effect is explained with the practice-makes-perfect hypoth-
esis through static effects of scale with little evidence of learning-by-doing. The
centralization of those medical procedures is recommended given that this policy




Over the last decades the Portuguese hospital adult mortality rate has fallen. On
the other hand, the volume of activity inside the hospitals has increased each year.
In particular, we observe an increasing trend in the number of hospital admissions.
Comparing these two facts, can we find any relationship? Is it the case that a
reduction in the mortality rate is related to an increase in the volume of activity
inside a hospital? This is an important question in Portugal, especially due to
new arrangements that have been adopted in the health sector (e.g., creation of
specialized units of care).1
The analysis of the correlation between number of procedures and outcomes is
common in several markets. An application of this sort can be found in the health
care context as well. In general, the results indicate that better health outcomes
tend to come with a larger number of procedures. However, the studies generally
concentrate efforts on the US health market or other private markets, leaving hos-
pitals belonging to the National Health Service (NHS) outside the discussion. This
is quite unexpected, because the European health services are basically publicly
provided and a NHS exists in many countries (UK, Spain, Italy, etc).
The correlation is called volume-outcome effect and the main hypotheses to
explain the mechanism are “practice-makes-perfect” (PMP) and “selective refer-
ral” (SR) (Luft et al., 1987). The first hypothesis, which can be explained by scale
economies or learning-by-doing, says that a greater volume of procedures leads to
improved outcomes (given that the severity level of the cases remains relatively
constant); whereas SR supports the notion that high quality centers attract more
patients, which leads to a higher volume of procedures.
Considering potential benefits derived from the volume-outcome effect, we try,
in a context of NHS, to answer the question “Does centralization of some medical
procedures increase the quality of health indicators?” The novelty of this paper
relates to the nature of the system analyzed. Private and public markets share
1In fact, the concentration of hospital services is one of the recommenda-
tions contained in the Portuguese Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), an
agreement required for obtaining financial assistance. More details available at
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/GC19/Documentos/PCM/1R MoU 20110901.pdf.
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similar features, such as hospital payment system, among others. However, public
health markets present characteristics that are idiosyncratic to them, including the
fact of not being exposed to competition, and these might make a difference in the
quantity and quality of services provided for the patients as well as for the expense
of resources needed by the system to provide such services. Arguments such as
the fact that size of public hospitals are set according to planning criteria instead
of an economic optimal criteria and that closure of hospitals seldom occurs in the
NHS, reinforce the possibility of having a different interaction between volume of
medical procedures and outcomes than what is observed in the private markets.
Using a dataset from the Portuguese NHS spanning eight years, this study con-
centrates on the existence, or not, of benefits in terms of better health outcomes
coming from increases in volume of medical procedures. These potential benefits
are considered at both hospital and patient level. The linear and probit estima-
tion methods show evidence that supports an inverse relation between volume of
medical procedures and mortality rate/outcome for some diagnosis-related groups
(DRG).
At the hospital level 7 out of 21 DRGs showed evidence of the volume-outcome
effect, whereas 10 of them did so at the patient level. Sensitivity analysis excluding
observations of transfer cases between hospitals revealed a similar result, suggest-
ing that a transfer to another hospital is likely to occur randomly (in the medical
sense and from the perspective of the external observer). The initial restriction
of the volume-outcome effect to be explained by the SR hypothesis, due to the
normative definition of a catchment area for each NHS hospital, leaves only the
PMP hypothesis to be explained.2 To this purpose, probit models were run and
the strongest evidence of the volume-outcome effect, with causality from volume to
outcome, was found for the following medical procedures: cerebral infarction, res-
piratory infections, circulatory disorders with acute myocardial infarction (AMI),
bowel procedures, cirrhosis, and hip and femur procedures. Moreover, the mecha-
nism works through a static scale effect, with little evidence for learning-by-doing.
Instrumental variables (IV) analysis was provided to conclude for the exogeneity
of the volume variable. The quadratic specification between volume and outcome
rather than the linear one gives consistent evidence of the volume-outcome effect
2See details in section 1.4, subsection 1.4.3.
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across the different model specifications for 5 out of the 21 DRGs. With regard
to policy, the centralization of those medical procedures is recommended given
that such a policy, keeping all other variables constant, would save a considerable
number of lives.
This study is organized into six additional sections. Section 2 discusses the lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the methodology used. Section 4 discusses the results.
Section 5 provides some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
The literature reports a relationship between hospital volume or surgeon volume
and outcomes through mortality rates and other proxies. In general, there seems
to exist a positive correlation between higher volume and better outcomes. Some
of the studies seek to identify the causality, mainly summarized as the PMP or SR
hypotheses. However, the data and diseases investigated vary across studies. The
review of 135 papers from 1980 to 2000 reached such conclusion: the variation in
the results found is considerably large (Halm et al., 2002; Hodgson et al., 2005).
The most widely used outcome measure is the in-hospital mortality rate. In
many cases it is adjusted for severity of the disease. For some diseases, more
demanding measures can also be used as the outcome (e.g., coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG) as the outcome for the volume of percutaneous translumial coronary
angioplasty (PTCA)). Current volume of procedures in a given hospital prevails
over the cumulative volume of procedures, occasionally used to try to capture
learning-by-doing effects. Several studies apply the logistic regression, according to
the distribution of the data. Furthermore, the PMP hypothesis seems to dominate
the SR hypothesis for most of the investigated diseases in the majority of results
(Flood et al., 1984; Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Ho, 2002; Gaynor et al., 2005).
One limitation in this vast literature, however, is related to the samples used.
Almost all of them are conducted using data from the United States and the results
can only be extended to private markets (at first). This work aims to fill a gap
in the literature, investigating the volume-outcome effect in the Portuguese health
sector, a NHS similar to others in Europe. This might allow the results to be
extended to other NHS. We stress the fact that we work in a scenario without
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competition, which can affect the behavior of the agents in several ways that can
influence the relationship between volume of medical procedures and outcomes.
The fact that public hospitals have less pressure to be in the efficient size than
private hospitals is an example of how competition can affect the scenario.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Data
The data come from the DRG dataset, which is organized by Administração Cen-
tral do Sistema de Saúde, I.P. (ACSS). It includes all inpatient discharges at the
NHS and the procedures are classified according to the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). The sample is drawn using
observations from 2001 to 2008 (and 1997 to 2008, in some cases).3 We included
hospital information data (case-mix index (cmi), beds, length of stay (lstay), dis-
charged patients (dp), and cost) from ACSS and hospital reports, available at the
ACSS website as well.
The initial sample size including all discharges from 2001 to 2008 is 9,523,301
observations. Private hospitals and observations related to hospitals that appear
only in three or fewer years were excluded (4.45% of the dataset, 6 hospitals).
Also, observations of some hospitals were combined due to the creation of the
health centers.4
The DRGs used in the study were selected according to the following criteria,
applied cumulatively: all DRGs that represent more than 1% in the whole sample
(discharges of all hospitals from 2001 to 2008) were kept; DRGs with no positive
mortality rate were excluded; DRGs with small representation in the whole sample
but with high relative mortality rates or cost were kept; DRGs studied exhaustively
in the earlier literature were included whenever possible.
After applying the selection criteria the sample size becomes smaller, with
880,449 observations (9.67% of the original sample) and 21 workable DRGs. There
3Data from 1997 to 2000 were used to build the accumulated volume variable from 2001 to
2004.
4Decretos-lei and Portarias of the Portuguese Ministério da Saúde were used to combine the
data.
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are medical and surgical DRGs in which 7 are cancer-related, which were also
analyzed in the literature (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Schoder and Lichtenberg, 2010).
Table 1.1: Selected DRGs
DRG Type Description Criteria Obs. %
14 M Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction 1 179,131 20.35
78 M Pulmonary embolism 3 12,851 1.46
79 M Respiratory infections and inflammations. age >17, CC 3 28,628 3.25
82 M Respiratory neoplasms 2 37,074 4.21
89 M Simple pneumonia and pleurisy 1 158,017 17.95
107 S Coronary bypass with cardiac catheterism without PTCA 3 2,804 0.32
109 S Coronary bypass without cardiac catheterism without PTCA 3 12,798 1.45
113 S Amputation for circulatory system disorders except upper limb and toe 3 17,989 2.04
121 M Circulatory disorders with AMI 3 60,325 6.85
127 M Heart failure and shock 1 115,447 13.11
148 S Major small and large bowel procedures, CC 3 33,605 3.82
172 M Digestive malignancy. CC 2 36,717 4.17
202 M Cirrhosis and alcoholic hepatitis 3 51,320 5.83
203 M Malignancy of hepatobiliary system or pancreas 2 27,271 3.1
210 S Hip and femur procedures. except major joint. age >17, CC 3 19,964 2.27
274 M Malignant breast disorders, CC 2 7,586 0.86
318 M Kidney and urinary tract neoplasms, CC 2 7,083 0.8
366 M Female reproductive system malignancy, CC 2 7,371 0.84
395 M Red blood cell disorders, age >17 3 30,317 3.44
403 M Lymphoma and non-acute leukemia, CC 2 16,123 1.83
416 M Septicemia 2 18,028 2.05
880,449 100.00
Notes:
Type: M is medical and S, surgical.
Criteria: 1 means high significance; 2, high relative mortality; and 3, high relative cost and/or earlier research.
CC: With complication.
DRG 121 = DRGs (121 + 122 + 123)
Some earlier studies performed the analysis of the volume-outcome effect at
disease level instead of DRG level, i.e., grouping DRGs that are related to the
same disease but differ in the degree of complication, age of patients, among other
factors. There are good reasons to work at disease and DRG levels. However,
we choose not to aggregate them, otherwise additional control variables (for the
differences among the DRGs grouped) such as percentage of more complicated
cases should be included in the model.
The measure of volume is the current total number of discharges of each DRG,
by hospital and year. The outcome variables vary depending on what level of data






where h indexes the hospital and t, the year, is the outcome variable when the
level of analysis is the hospital. Otherwise, using patient level data, the outcome
is a binary variable such that:
outcomen,h,t =
0, if the patient n leaves the hospital alive;1, otherwise; (1.2)
where n indexes the patient and remaining indexes are the same as before.
The measure of the outcome is a constraint imposed by the availability of data.
Instead, the utilization of a more accurate measure such as the thirty-days outcome
would be more appropriate in some cases. For this reason, the results for some
DRGs must be interpreted carefully. To give an example, most of the people do
not die immediately after the hip and femur procedure (DRG 210) and thirty-days
mortality rate would be the most preferred outcome measure, if available.
The sample characteristics reveal that the mean age of the patients is 70 years,
which is an old sample generated by chance. Approximately half of them are
women. For the hospitals, the mean cmi is 1.06, whereas beds is 327, dp is 11,837
per year, lstay is around 8 days and cost is 5,000 euros. Volume of medical pro-
cedures and mean mortality rates were fairly stable over the years, with slight
variation for some DRGs.5
1.3.2 Empirical strategy
The first set of analyses is done at the hospital level, using panel data, mean
variables of mortality rates, and patient characteristics. Even when taking into
account the potential loss of control for some individual characteristics of the pa-
tients, we believe that the benefits of such analysis are worthwhile. It is possible
to set fixed effects at hospital level and control for potential unobservable charac-
teristics, as done by Farley and Ozminkowski (1992) and Hamilton and Ho (1998).
5Complete data at https://sites.google.com/site/giseletbraun/home/research/appendix.pdf.
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For each DRG the estimated equations are:
morth,t = α + β × volumeh,t + δ ×m ageh,t + φ× f womenh,t + θ × χh,t (1.3)
+εh,t
where the indexes are the same as before. The m age is the mean age of the
patients, f women is the percentage of women, and χ is a vector of hospital
characteristics, namely, cmi, beds, dp, lstay, and cost. We do not have physician
payment information or any other proxy to control for the potential fact that
better paid physicians are expected to perform better. However, the fixed effects
set at hospital level controls for any variation of this kind. The volume-outcome
effect is identified if β < 0.
The second part deals with individual patient data. The dependent variable is
the outcome and mean variables are replaced by individual patient characteristics,
increasing the amount of information in the model. The change from panel data to
a repeated cross-section one is due to data restrictions.6 The standard errors are
clustered at hospital level to accommodate the fact that we have not only patient
information on the regressors but also group averages for hospital characteristics.7
For each DRG, the estimated equations are:
outcomen,h,t = α + β × volumeh,t + δ × agen + φ× gendern + γ × tddxn
+θ × χh,t + εn,h,t (1.4)
where n indexes the patient and the other indexes and variables are the same as
before. The tddx variable is the total number of main and secondary diagnoses,
which is included in the model to control for the severity of the diseases. It is
an imperfect substitute for the fact that our measure of outcome has no severity
adjustments. The identification of the volume-outcome effect is again identified
using the estimated β in each regression.
The next specification is applied to the learning-by-doing analysis. In order to
capture influence of past volume of procedures on outcome, besides the current
6The dataset has no patient identification.
7The assumption of independence over observations is replaced by the independence among
clusters, which are the hospitals.
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one, we define the accumvol, which stands for accumulated volume and is the sum
of the number of discharges in a given hospital in the last four years. The equation,
estimated for each DRG, is:
outcomen,h,t = α + β × volumeh,t + η × accumvolh,t + δ × agen





volumeh,t, t ∈ {2001, . . . , 2008} (1.6)
The hypotheses tested are: (1) existence of economies of scale: β < 0 and η = 0;
(2) existence of learning-by-doing: β ≤ 0 and η < 0.8
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Analysis at the hospital level
The natural assumption is that the volume of medical procedures has an inverse
relationship with mortality rate. The starting point is the hospital level analysis
through a linear regression, considering fixed effects at this level, with volume
as the only independent variable to explain mortality rates. From these, 6 out
of 21 DRGs support evidence for a potential volume-outcome effect, at the 5%
level of significance (and 4 more DRGs at 10% level of significance). However,
these estimated coefficients might be over or even underestimating the real effects
due to the absence of further controls. Adding extra information about average
patients (m age and f women) and hospitals (cmi, beds, dp, lstay, and cost), the
regressions show that 7 out of 21 DRGs reveal the volume-outcome effect at the
same significance level. The mean age of the patients, the fraction of women, and
8Estimation of a quadratic relation between outcome and volume were considered by the
addition of the term β2 × volume2 in equations 3, 1.4 and 1.5. The term volume × beds is
added to equations 1.4 and 1.5 to control for the fact that the volume-outcome effect might be
of different magnitude depending on the size of the hospital.
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all hospital control variables have, in most of the cases, a non-significant effect.9
At this point it is worth giving attention to the predictions of the mortality
rates to be between 0 and 1. For the DRGs 78, 203, and 366 only one prediction
was greater than one and this can be considered as an error. Moreover, predictions
of mortality rates less than 0 were identified for less than 5% of the observations,
not for all DRGs, allowing us to interpret the results safely even when the model
does not restrict the predictions.
1.4.2 Analysis at the patient level
Overview
The results show that 10 out of 21 DRGs have a significant estimated coefficient for
the volume variable.10 For the remaining independent variables, age and tddx have
mainly a significant and positive relationship with mortality. The gender variable
has a significant coefficient with sign that varies depending on what disease we are
dealing with. On the other hand, most hospital control variables are statistically
non-significant.11 A subsample without transfer cases was drawn and it shows
results similar to the general sample, with addition of DRG 127, which indicates
that the inclusion or exclusion of the transfer cases might modify some results. It
can be interpreted as if the most complicated cases are being transferred to the
hospitals that have more success when performing this medical procedure, which
refers to heart failure and shock.12
It is noteworthy to highlight the robustness of our results across the two levels
9Subsample without hospital transfer cases (patients that are first admitted in a given hospi-
tal but end up being treated in another) was selected to verify if instead of being a random process,
it might be the case that transfers occur in the most complicated cases. The results were similar: 6
DRGs support the volume-outcome effect at the 5% level of significance, where DRG 403 is new on
the list, suggesting that transfer cases might be relevant. Still, DRGs 89 and 210 do not support
the effect anymore. See https://sites.google.com/site/giseletbraun/home/research/appendix.pdf
for complete results.
10The positive sign of β for DRG 109 signs the opposite of the PMP hypothesis and it may
indicate that transfers are not happening as a random process, but instead, selective referral,
which is not officially permitted in the Portuguese NHS, is actually taking place.
11No relevant interaction between the explanatory variables was found.
12Transfers in and transfers out represent, respectively, 11.5% and 5.28% of the total sample.
Moreover, it was observed that both transfers are decreasing over time.
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of analyses. Furthermore, medical, surgical, and cancer-related DRGs are included
among those that show evidence of volume-outcome effect.
Comparing them with results reported in the literature, DRGs 107, 121, 148
and 203 were previously described as medical procedures with volume-outcome
effect (Flood et al., 1984; Luft et al., 1987; Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Gowrisankaran
et al., 2006; Ramanarayanan, 2006). For DRG 127 it was found the opposite
result of selective referral (Farley and Ozminkowski, 1992) and for DRG 203 it was
identified no correlation. These comparisons indicate that some diseases might
have a similar volume-outcome effect even though we are considering different
types of health systems, but still the type of health system might be important
for other diseases.
Economies of scale and learning-by-doing
The volume-outcome effect has two main possible explanations: PMP or SR hy-
potheses. Given that the Portuguese health system design precludes the SR hy-
pothesis, we end up with the need to further explain the PMP hypothesis. It may
come from two different effects: scale effect or the learning-by-doing process.
One structure to deal with this question is to use current and accumulated
volume as explanatory variables of the outcome. If only today’s volume affects
today’s outcome, then we are facing a static scale effect. On the other hand,
if today’s volume might affect both today’s outcome and future outcomes, than
we have the effect via learning-by-doing (Gaynor et al., 2005). Regarding policy
implications, the identification of scale effects matters less for the selection of which
hospital will concentrate the activities, it is only important to increase volume in
any hospital. However, if learning-by-doing is recognized, more careful merging of
activities should be considered: given the fact that a merger implies the reduction
in volume of activity in one hospital and the increase in the volume of activity
in another hospital, it should not be reduced in the hospital that is improving
through learning-by-doing.
The lagged accumulated volume’s variables appear to be highly correlated
among themselves, and some of the earlier studies exclude the correlated variables
(Schoder and Lichtenberg, 2010). This pattern clouds the results when describing
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the mechanism through which volume affects outcome in the context of the PMP
hypothesis. Our sample is not an exception and the current volume has correlation
with accumulated volume that is around 0.87.
The regressions show that 6 out of the 10 DRGs, the ones identified in the
patient level analysis of the general sample, have a static relationship that char-
acterizes the scale effect. The coefficients for the accumvol variable are mainly
non-significant, except for DRG 148, indicating that learning-by-doing is not a
plausible explanation for the PMP hypothesis.13
Similar result in the literature can be found in Gaynor et al. (2005). It shows
that only contemporaneous effects were statistically significant when explaining
probability of death in terms of current and accumulated volume of medical pro-
cedures for the CABG.14
1.4.3 Exogeneity
The causality between the outcome and volume variables are key for policy im-
plications and there is no consensus in the literature. It was reported that some
DRGs support the PMP hypothesis while others might support the SR hypothesis.
In some cases both hypotheses can be supported for the same DRG.
Portuguese patients in the NHS are directed to one or another hospital accord-
ing to their area of residence. In principle this would automatically exclude the
SR hypothesis. However, different arrangements can occur between patients and
physicians. The sensitivity analysis of patient results demonstrated that DRG 127
supports the volume-outcome effect after the exclusion of the transfer cases. This
fact may be a consequence of SR or a random process. In any case, we need to
argue, more formally, that SR is not occurring.
Most studies support the PMP hypothesis and they exclude the SR hypothesis
sometimes using the Hausman-Wu test, as in Gaynor et al. (2005), or the Smith
and Blundell exogeneity test, as in Ho (2002), or even using a test to check if there
13The subsample without the hospital transfer cases has a weaker scale effect, identified only
for 3 DRGs.
14These results are not perfectly comparable with ours, given that Gaynor et al. (2005) dis-







on as the explanatory variables.
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is a correlation between volume and the residuals of the regressions, as in Farley
and Ozminkowski (1992). Other authors explain in plain words the impossibility
of SR as a plausible hypothesis, as did in Schoder and Lichtenberg (2010).
The analysis of no SR in our data is performed with the IV probit regression
model. The current volume of medical procedures is instrumented with the past
year volume of medical procedures. The argument is the following: (1) the reason
to suspect the endogeneity of volume of medical procedures comes from the fact
that unobservable shocks affecting outcome can also affect volume of medical pro-
cedures. Therefore, we treat volume as an endogenous variable, i.e, the exogenous
increase in the volume of medical procedures can affect outcome, but the better
outcome can also attract more patients to the hospital that is improving the out-
comes, affecting volume again; (2) the selection of past year volume of medical
procedures as the instrument variable relies on the fact that it is correlated with
current volume of medical procedures, the instrumented variable, but it is un-
correlated with outcome, because an exogenous shock in outcome can also affect
today’s volume of medical procedures but cannot affect past year’s volume of the
same medical procedure. The results of the Wald test of exogeneity for the volume
variable implies that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that volume of medical
procedures is an exogenous variable, except for DRGs 107 and 416.
1.5 Extensions
1.5.1 Alternative specification
The volume-outcome effect based on a linear relationship between outcome and
volume is more intuitive and the most usually applied specification in the earlier
literature. However, it is feasible to think that there is a limit in enhancement
of the outcomes due to an increase in the number of medical procedures inside a
hospital. An almost empty hospital is expected to have poorer outcomes than the
one that performs a higher number of a given medical procedure, but a crowded
hospital is also expected to suffer from not being able to offer the best medical care
that it could offer in the case that demand were smaller. Therefore, it is adequate
to determine what the volume-outcome effect is in the Portuguese NHS if we allow
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the relationship between outcome and volume to be quadratic.
The results for hospital data are less evident than in the linear case and the
magnitude of the effects are smaller. The same applies to the patient data: the
effect was identified for 6 DRGs out of 21, with scale effect recognized for 5 DRGs.
Noteworthy is the concave shape of the curve that relates outcome and volume of
medical procedures indicated by the predominant negative sign of the estimated
coefficients of the volume variable and positive sign of the volume sq variable.
Moreover, the variable volume*beds is predominantly negative and significant for
almost all DRGs, pointing out that the magnitude of the volume-outcome effect
varies with the size of the hospital.15
1.5.2 Economic impact
The real impact of the volume-outcome effect depends on the volume of activity
inside the hospital. Medical activity is affected by different arrangements of the
health system. Volume could be leveraged with centralization of medical proce-
dures. A possible exercise is to verify what would happen with outcome when
the volume is hypothetically increased through centralization of the two highest-
volume hospitals, for each DRG that was identified with volume-outcome effect in
the linear model of the hospital level analysis.
We calculated the change in the 2008 mortality rate induced by the hypo-
thetical centralization effect (sum of the volume of medical procedures for both
hospitals). Other criteria could be used to reunite activities: reunion based on
close-by hospitals would be more expected in reality. However, we stick to the
analysis with the largest ones because they might be a good sign of existence of
benefits.
We can avoid up to 52 out of 446 deaths with the centralization of the medical
care, as calculated for DRG 14. Ceteris paribus, the centralization of the two
highest-volume hospitals that provide medical care classified as DRG 14 would
imply a reduction of 12% in deaths, according to the estimates of our model.
15Subsample without transfer cases shows the volume-outcome effect with economies of scale,
for DRGs 14, 79, 148, and 202.
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Table 1.2: Economic impact of centralization
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
DRG hosp β vol gain mort m̂ort deaths d̂eaths POTENTIAL SAVED LIVES
14 X -0.00010 1480 -0.117 0.186 0.186 275 275 -60 -52
Y 1170 0.205 0.146 240 171
89 Y -0.00006 1435 -0.056 0.265 0.258 380 371 -32 -31
W 931 0.199 0.204 185 190
121 X -0.00041 635 -0.141 0.055 0.055 35 35 -11 -10
Z 345 0.125 0.100 43 35
202 W -0.00026 300 -0.077 0.137 0.162 41 49 -7 -7
S 296 0.152 0.138 45 41
203 S -0.00083 224 -0.149 0.241 0.307 54 69 -22 -22
Y 180 0.528 0.452 95 81
210 Y -0.00067 205 -0.088 0.049 0.013 10 3 -1 -1
T 132 0.015 0.052 2 7
274 U -0.00229 86 -0.110 0.349 0.318 30 27 -6 -6
V 48 0.458 0.549 22 26
Notes:
III = β × (
∑
vol− vol);
V I = β ×mort;
V II = β × m̂ort;
V II = gain×
∑
mort;
V III = gain×
∑
m̂ort.
The earlier literature reported reduction in the mortality rates goes from 0.5%
to 6.8% in response to an increase in the volume of activity. The hypothetical cen-
tralization used in our computations implies an increase in volume that sometimes
goes up to 100%, which can explain the larger numbers achieved (from 5.53% to
14.67%).
1.6 Final remarks
In the work developed by Gaynor et al. (2005), a positive correlation between
greater volume of medical procedures and better health outcomes for CABG in
the US health market is reported. A question that we can address is whether
it might also occur in a NHS. It is an important issue because several countries’
NHS in Europe are nationally supported and so, the incentives and behavior of
the economic agents might be different from what is reported in the literature for
private markets. We used data from Portugal, where the NHS has some different
features. Patients cannot choose the hospital where they are going to receive
medical care. They are allocated according to the place of residence.
The volume-outcome effect, defined as the correlation between volume of med-
ical procedures and outcomes, has been identified for some DRGs. The data show
strong evidence in favor of the PMP hypothesis for 6 medical procedures: cerebral
16
infarction, respiratory infections, circulatory disorders with AMI, bowel proce-
dures, cirrhosis, and hip and femur procedures. The gains in the outcomes are
mainly caused by scale effects. Weak evidence of learning-by-doing is observed.
Moreover, exogeneity of the volume variable is verified with IV probit models,
where lagged volume variable is used as the instrument. The centralization of
those medical procedures is recommended given that such policy, keeping all other
variables constant, would save many lives.
Other relevant issues, such as transfer of costs from the State to the patients















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3: Partial regression coefficients
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Chapter 2




Evidence from the US pointed out, over the years, to the existence of upcoding in
management practices. Upcoding is defined as classifying patients in DRG codes
associated with larger payments. The incentive for upcoding is not particular to
private providers of care. Conceptually, any patient classification system that is
used for payment purposes may be vulnerable to this sort of strategic behavior by
providers. We document here that upcoding occurs in a National Health Service
(NHS) where public hospitals have their payment (budget) tied to the classification
of treatment episodes. Using DRG data from Portugal we found that the practice
of upcoding has being used in the hospitals in a way leading to larger budgets.
The effect is quantitatively small.
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2.1 Introduction
Upcoding has been documented empirically in US hospitals and their Medicare
system.1 However, no current theory or empirical evidence addresses the issue in
the context of national health services.2 This is somewhat surprising as patient
classification systems are now common in many countries, several of them having
a National Health Service (NHS) and using DRG-like systems to pay providers of
health care.
The use of prospective payment based on patients classification systems has be-
come widespread. A crucial aspect of payments by episode is the coding of each
patient. In the US, the first country to have payments to health providers based
on diagnosis-related groups (DRG), a concern often raised was that of upcoding.
The practice of upcoding consists in shifting the DRG of a patient to another DRG
yielding a higher payment from the third-party provider.
As countries with a NHS also adopt patient classification systems and prospective
payments to their public hospitals, the very same question can be asked: do we
observe upcoding in the public sector? Should it be a concern in the context of
the NHS? Our analysis shows that upcoding can also be present in a NHS system,
though the link between episode coding and funding is weaker than in private
markets. The study was done with data from the Portuguese NHS. A politically-
driven change in DRG prices was the exogenous fact used to assess whether public
hospitals upcode in response to changes in the relative prices of DRGs.
Portugal has a NHS since 1979, and in the early eighties a version of the US DRGs
was introduced. The system has been adjusted over time, both in terms of number
and definition of DRGs, as well as the prices paid for each DRG. During the early
years, there was no clear link between the budget that each public hospital received
and its activity. For a long time, budgets were yearly revised based on historic
costs or deficits were run without managers caring about it as sooner or later
fresh money from the Government would come in any way. Thus, the soft-budget
constraint effect rendered relatively irrelevant the “price” given to each DRG and
they were revised sporadically and without a sound underlying cost analysis.
1Upcoding is also known as DRG creep in the related literature.
2See Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Dafny (2005) for recent accounts of upcoding.
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By 2002, a major change occurred in the Portuguese NHS, with new, more
entrepreneurial-like, management rules being introduced in nearly half of pub-
lic hospitals. Different management teams were brought in to the public hospitals.
Their performance, either under the new or the old statutes, became under more
scrutiny. Even if no public hospital has become bankrupt, it has occurred a clear
hardening in the budget constraint. Now the hospitals have to sign a contract with
the Ministry of Health that describes the expected activity and overall budget for
the next year. The information from the DRGs is actively being used to establish
the terms of the contracts. Thus, while under the old system, funding of hospitals
was dominated by the soft budget constraint effect and no incentive for upcoding
exists, under the new environment, upcoding delivers benefits to the hospital and
therefore can become a matter of concern to the purchaser of care (Ministry of
Health).
The changes in DRG prices provide an exogenous source of variation, not related
to evolution in hospital costs, that may have an impact on hospital decisions. This
enables us with variation to identify upcoding behavior within a NHS framework.
Since the price’s changes are not equally relevant to all DRGs, we trace whether
shifts in DRG coding toward higher priced DRGs were stronger in those cases
where the relative price of a DRG changed the most. Another issue of interest is
whether upcoding is more likely to occur in the set of hospitals that received a
new type of statute (entrepreneurial-like) or is common to all hospitals, including
pure public hospitals.3
In particular, the study analyzes the Portuguese exogenous DRGs price change
that occurred in 2006, using public hospital data from 2001 to 2008. We found
evidence of upcoding in the more recent years. The hospitals respond to price
changes in DRGs including more patients into the DRGs that are more profitable.
No distinction across types of hospitals was detected, regarding upcoding behavior.
The paper is organized into 7 sections. Section 2 presents a literature review. Sec-
tion 3 describes the Portuguese NHS and the exogenous politically-driven change
in prices. Section 4 presents a simple model generating our empirical predictions.
Section 5 explains the methodology used and section 6 discusses the results ob-
3The managers of pure public hospitals were also put under pressure as the transformed
hospitals become a benchmark for them.
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tained. Section 7 presents the concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature review
A recent theory treatment of upcoding is due to Kuhn and Siciliani (2013). Their
focus is on how quality, “manipulative effort” (their upcoding aspect) and auditing
interact with the payment rule defined by a third-party payer (which can be a NHS)
to a provider. Upcoding takes in Kuhn and Siciliani (2013) a particular role: it
increases the number of patients treated and the average DRG weight. The analysis
assumes hospital management to be profit maximizer or surplus maximizer within
the NHS.4
From their model, it follows quite naturally that higher prices generate higher
manipulative efforts and higher output. More auditing effort reduces upcoding.
The price instrument influences quality provided but auditing does not. Their
work nicely explores this difference in the instruments available to the purchaser
(third-party payer).
To our empirical purposes, their model is not directly applicable although the
implications do carry out. We stick closer to the implicit setup of Dafny (2005),
in which demand is exogenous to the hospital and upcoding consists in the clas-
sification of patients in a higher price DRG. Exogeneity of demand is, given the
existence of well defined catchment areas for the Portuguese NHS hospitals, the
reasonable assumption. Although some auditing exists, we do not have informa-
tion on its results, and we cannot explore this dimension of the problem. Since
DRGs have been in place since the mid-eighties and coding accuracy has been
audited since the beginning, we do not expect a major role played by this element.
The work of Dafny (2005) focused on the US hospitals responses to price changes
of the DRGs. She found that hospitals upcoded patients in order to increase
profits, by reimbursements, and hospitals upcode more in the DRGs where the
price increase was greater. Moreover, it occurred chiefly in the for-profit hospitals,
and there was no increase in intensity or quality of care. Another studies found the
same conclusion, namely Carter and Ginsburg (1985), Hsia et al. (1988), Steinwald
4Kuhn and Siciliani (2013) argue on behalf of their assumption with managerial discretion
to use generated surplus even within the NHS.
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and Dummit (1989), Carter et al. (1990) and Silverman et al. (1999). Some studies,
using a selected group of DRGs, could not prove the upcoding behavior, though
they highlighted consistent evidence with it, as Silverman and Skinner (2004).
There is a part of the literature that mainly studied the case mix index (CMI),
which measures the complexity of episodes treated in a hospital. It is calculated
using DRG weights and a proxy of the total number of patients treated in the
hospital. The aim of these studies is to explain the reasons that led CMI to increase
since the implementation of the prospective payment system (PPS). Carter and
Ginsburg (1985), Hsia et al. (1988), Steinwald and Dummit (1989) and Carter et al.
(1990) attempted to explain such increase in the CMI. Carter and Ginsburg (1985)
explained that, from the 8.4% accumulated CMI increase from 1981 to 1984, 3.3%
could be due to upcoding. Hsia et al. (1988) measured the incorrect coding that
occurred under the PPS from 1984 to 1985. Doing a review of medical records,
they found an error rate of 20.8% in the DRG codes. Also, they concluded that
small hospitals were associated with greater error rate. Steinwald and Dummit
(1989) argued that, behind the 20% CMI increase in US from 1983 to 1988, only
8% was due to formal changes in DRG weights, suggesting upcoding as the culprit
for the remaining increase. Using a sophisticated code system, Carter et al. (1990)
decomposed the 2.4% increase in the CMI of the US hospitals between 1986 and
1987. They found that one third of that value was due to upcoding. Kroneman
and Nagy (2001), using a sample of Hungarian episodes, did not find any relation
between implementation of DRGs and increasing in the CMI from 1992 to 1995.
Some studies analyzed the association between hospital ownership and upcoding
behavior. Silverman et al. (1999) found that for-profit US hospitals presented the
greatest evidence, after the adoption of DRGs, suggesting the existence of upcod-
ing behavior in 1989, 1992 and 1995. Silverman and Skinner (2004) studied the
hospital ownership connection with upcoding for DRGs associated to pneumonia
and respiratory infections, using data from 1989 to 1996. They did not prove the
existence of upcoding, though it was suggested, especially for those DRGs for which
the severity level is more difficult to distinguish. Xirasagar and Lin (2006) tested
the presence of upcoding for hernia operation and cataract surgery using Taiwan
National Health Insurance Research Database of 2001. They concluded that large
public teaching hospitals are more likely to admit these types of procedures than
28
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.
Other related research topics were investigated, indirectly motivated by the up-
coding behavior, after the changes in the US health market’s rules. Lave (1985)
pointed out that compression was occurring in the US DRG prices, in the sense
that high cost DRGs had been set lower to their actual costs and low cost DRGs
had been set higher, and this might have important implications on DRG creep.
Psaty et al. (1999) calculated the potential upcoding costs per year for heart fail-
ure procedures in US from 1986 to 1993, highlighting the size of the problem for
the society.
Two other contributions are to be mentioned. Rauner and Schaffhauser-Linzatti
(2002) studied the impacts in the health system of Austria after the implementa-
tion of the PPS in 1997. They obtained indicators that showed cost reductions
and improvements in quality indexes for their hospitals; Steinbusch et al. (2007)
conducted a comparative study among American, Australian and Dutch’s case mix
reimbursement systems, showing the type of market, control system and case mix
characteristics as the variables that could motivate or inhibit the upcoding. This is
a relevant study in political terms that points out to particular requirements that
should be taken into account when planning to implement or improve a health
system.
The conclusion in the literature is that there is an agreement among the results
of studies for the US, making clear the existence of upcoding after the PPS’s
implementation. It seems to be a non equal behavior that depends on hospital
ownership and the characteristics of the DRGs. This study addresses upcoding
behavior in the context of a public hospital system. While it is often believed
that public hospitals may behave differently than for-profit or not-for-profit private
hospitals, it can be counterargued that incentive is what matters. Our contribution
is the identification of upcoding evidence in a public health system, using data
from Portugal, a country with a NHS that adopted the use of a DRG system in
the mid-eighties.
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2.3 The Portuguese health system
The Portuguese health care system is based on a NHS. Under the traditional public
service approach to financing NHS hospitals, little incentive for upcoding exists.
Although a budget was attributed to the hospital at the beginning of the year, the
values were typically below the expenditures of the hospital in the previous year.
Hospitals were aware, generally speaking, that budget reinforcements would be
received, sooner or later. Thus, the payment system to the public NHS hospitals
entailed no relation to DRG values.
The implementation of the DRG system in Portugal started in 1984, with an
agreement between the Ministry of Health and Yale University. The two main
objectives of the protocol were to test the possibility of making use of the DRGs
and to develop an information and financing system. The results of the study were
good enough in such a way that in 1987 a patient classification system was starting
to be implemented in the Portuguese NHS. The transition period to a system of
payments based on DRGs started in 1989 and this modified the incentives to
produce and improve health goods. The operationalization was made in 1990, but
not reflected in the payment system in a straightforward away.
The budgeting process did allow for some role of predicted costs by the DRG sys-
tem in its formulae, though it also took into account historical cost data. Initial
budgets were seldom respected by hospitals. Regularly, extra budgets were given,
making any role of DRGs in the payment system illusive. The year of 2003 wit-
nessed an important change in hospital management rules, bringing roughly half
of the public hospitals to a trust-like juridic form and management rules closer to
those of the private sector. No fundamental changes in the budgeting process took
place. In 2005, the new Government established a budgeting process that brought
hospital budgets at the beginning of the year closer to expected costs and man-
agement performance became under closer scrutiny. Hospital management teams
signed contract programs with regional health authorities, committing to achieve
pre-determined activity levels and costs. These changes introduced the financial
incentive for upcoding, as higher complexity of cases would bring more funds in
the future.
The Portuguese DRG prices changed in 2003 by a Government decree and remained
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stable until early 2006, when another set of prices was fixed. Then, an equal change
in prices for all DRGs was set in 2007 and no further change in prices occurred
in 2008. The price change was exogenously determined and politically-driven.
Therefore, the Portuguese NHS provides a natural bed test to assess the extent of
upcoding in a NHS.
The policy change of DRG prices was defined in the Portaria 567/2006, which
followed the previous prices set of the Portaria 132/2003 issued by the Portuguese
Ministry of Health.5 Table 2.1 shows the DRG pairs where the modification in the
weight or in the price was greater. An increase or decrease in weight or in price
acts as an impulse for upcoding responses. For example, from 2003 to 2006, the
DRG 32 increased its price and weight respectively 77.3% and 61.2%. It means
that DRG 32 become more profitable, given that costs did not increase in the same
magnitude. Such increases raised incentives for the occurrence of DRG creep.
Using these kind of changes, we aim to understand how hospitals respond to the
price increases or decreases: do they keep on the same behavior pattern, given that
the reasons for changes in price are mainly to adjust hospital costs or do the hos-
pitals behave strategically, upcoding, taking into account that control instruments
used are not powerful enough to verify every hospital action?
Table 2.1: Top 10 changes in prices and weights of DRGs
Price (euros) Weight Variation
DRG Description 2003 2006 2003 2006 ∆price ∆weight
32 Concussion age >17 w/o CC 638.83 1132.77 0.3 0.4836 0.773 0.612
34 Other disorders of nervous system w CC 3482.13 1713.92 1.64 0.7317 -0.508 -0.554
151 Peritoneal adhesiolysis w/o CC 2338.86 3738.67 1.1 1.5961 0.599 0.451
155 Stomach esophageal & duodenal procedures age
>17 w/o CC
4131.51 7245.92 1.94 3.0934 0.754 0.595
165 Appendectomy w complicated principal diag w/o
CC
1827.81 3306.97 0.86 1.4118 0.809 0.642
168 Mouth procedures w CC 6458.66 2451.3 3.03 1.0465 -0.620 -0.655
206 Disorders of liver except malig.cirr.alc hepa w/o
CC
1321.87 2279.6 0.62 0.9732 0.725 0.570
257 Dotal mastectomy for malignancy w CC 4667.36 2341.44 2.19 0.9996 -0.498 -0.544
283 Minor skin disorders w CC 3044.28 1247.32 1.43 0.5325 -0.590 -0.628
398 Reticuloendothelial & immunity disorders w CC 4545.15 2003.91 2.13 0.8555 -0.559 -0.598
5The changes in DRG weights are equal to the ones in prices, making the correlation between
changes in DRG prices and weights roughly equal to one.
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2.4 A quick illustrative model
To provide a background to our empirical procedure and the design of the ro-
bustness checks on the evidence of upcoding, we use a simple model. There is an
exogenous demand, unaffected by coding decisions, at the pair of closely related
DRGs: n = x1 + x2, where x1 refers to top DRG and x2, to bottom DRG, which
corresponds to the true demand.
The observed treatment is defined as u = x1 + g and d = x2− g, where g measures
the extent of upcoding (moving patients from bottom DRG to top DRG).
The objective function of the hospital is given by the profits minus the cost of
upcoding:
V = p1u+ p2d− c1x1 − c2x2 − 0.5sg2 (2.1)
where the last term aggregates all costs from upcoding into a quadratic cost func-
tion (auditing, detection and fines & ethical costs). The cost ci is independent of
coding and upcoding levels depend on price difference between the top and bot-
tom DRGs (this is the basis of the empirical strategy, borrowed in part from Dafny
(2005)). Under equation 2.1, the first-order condition for the choice of g depends
solely on s (the cost parameter of upcoding) and on (p1 − p2), the price difference
between the two DRGs of the same pair.








Under constant x1 and x2, f and g move in the same direction. If x1 and x2 move
due to other reasons (real effects), then inference is more complicated and it is
necessary to accommodate these facts into the empirical analysis. For this reason,
the drivers of the ratio x1/(x1 + x2) need to be studied carefully.
2.5 The empirical approach
We follow closely the empirical strategy laid down by Dafny (2005), however, we
add to her main equation other relevant variables, namely, age and gender of
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patients, characteristics of hospital and fixed effects at the pair of DRGs.6
Still relative to Dafny (2005), another difference in our sample is the co-existence
of hospitals operating under two distinct juridic regimes within the NHS. One of
them is the traditional public sector management system, while the other is an
entrepreneurial-like management model (although hospitals remain under complete
public ownership).
2.5.1 Data
The data used was the Portuguese DRG database, which is organized by Adminis-
tração Central do Sistema de Saúde (ACSS). Our sample is composed of hospital
discharges from 2001 to 2008. We included all hospitals or hospital centers, with
the exception of Hospital Amadora-Sintra, due to particular management charac-
teristics, not present in the other hospitals.7 The sample size is 54,593 observations
from 104 hospitals and/or hospital centers. Not all of them have been active in
all periods (unbalanced panel) as several hospitals merged to originate hospital
centers.
We selected 112 pairs of DRGs, each of them corresponding to two similar DRGs
that differ only by having or not having complications. For example, the pair
number 1 is composed by the DRGs 7, “periph & cranial nerve & other nerv syst
proc w CC”, and 8, “periph & cranial nerve & other nerv syst proc w/o CC”.8
The rationale behind the DRGs selection relates to the likelihood of catching the
upcoding: the ability to distinguish a patient wrongly coded between two DRGs
that only differ in the level of complication of the disease requires a specific knowl-
edge that in general only doctors have. Hence, the purchaser must proceed with
auditing and it is costly. In such scenario, the upcoding might be profitable, if not
detected.9
6From Dafny (2005), equation (3): fractionpt = α + ςpairp + δyeart + ψ∆spreadp,88−87 ×
post+ εpt.
7This hospital has been managed since 1996 by a private consortium under a public-private
partnership for management.
8Criteria of selection: from description of the DRGs, 145 pairs of DRGs were selected, where
the difference between each two DRGs in a pair is only by having or not having complications;
33 pairs were excluded due to lack of observations in our sample.
9Auditing does exist and codification of patients is done by especially trained doctors. These
factors help to contain the extent of upcoding. However, not much information is available about
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2.5.2 Variables and model specification
The basic dependent variable is the fraction of patients in the top DRG,
fractionipt, in hospital i, DRG pair p, and year t. Our interest lies in the re-
lationship of the fractionipt with the change in the relative price of a DRG, the
spreadp. This latter is the politically-driven exogenous variable, which is con-
structed in two steps. First, we take the difference between the value paid to the
hospital for an episode classified in the DRG with complications minus the value
paid for an episode of DRG without complications. Similar to Dafny (2005), p.














where p indexes the DRG pair and T indexes the year, which is 2003 or 2006, the
time of price changes. The DRG price is common to all hospitals as it is published
in the official Journal of the Government. Second, given this absolute value, we
take the difference over the years.10 Therefore, it is defined as:
spreadpp = spreadpp06 − spreadpp03 (2.4)
Besides prices, DRGs are also assigned weights to reflect their relative complexity.















spreadwp = spreadwp06 − spreadwp03 (2.6)
For some pairs of DRGs, price and weight changes are perfectly correlated while in
other cases prices may change without a change in the weight. Also, weights may
those audits.
10We use the full year as an approximation, though the new prices started to have effect only
in the middle of the year.
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be changed with price kept constant in other occasions. The DRG weights are
used to compute a case-mix index, which is used in the calculation of a hospital
budget.
Table 2.2 presents the values of the top 10 variation in spreads. As an example,
the pair 32 is composed by DRGs 110 and 111. The value of the price spread in
2003, e5,943.18, is the difference between the DRG prices e12,586.84 (DRG 110)
and 6,653.66 (DRG 111).11 We obtained the spreadpp for this pair by taking the
difference of price spreads in 2006 and 2003, after doing the same calculation for
price spread in 2006. For this specific pair of DRGs, the spread of prices reduced by
90.43%. It is noteworthy that, even within this top 10 list, there is a considerable
difference in variation of spread across DRG pairs.
Table 2.2: Source data example
Pair spreadp p03 spreadp p06 spreadp p spreadw p03 spreadw p06 spreadw p ∆spreadp ∆spreadw
(e) (units) (%)
32 5943.18 568.73 -5374.45 2.8 0.24 -2.56 -90.43 -91.33
35 1041.06 155.77 -885.29 0.49 0.07 -0.42 -85.04 -86.43
39 1236.18 2480.82 1244.64 0.58 1.06 0.48 100.68 82.60
52 1348.79 2091.04 742.25 0.64 0.89 0.25 55.03 39.48
87 1417.97 21.55 -1396.42 0.66 0.01 -0.65 -98.48 -98.61
88 988.95 56.92 -932.03 0.46 0.02 -0.44 -94.24 -94.72
98 637.54 1050.09 412.55 0.3 0.45 0.15 64.71 49.43
107 184.84 274.29 89.45 0.09 0.12 0.03 48.39 30.11
111 1573.79 186.21 -1387.58 0.74 0.08 -0.66 -88.17 -89.26
140 1777.47 2533.75 756.28 0.84 1.08 0.24 42.55 28.77
Source: Portaria 189/2001 of March 9th, effective April 1st;
Source: Portaria 132/2003 of February 5th, effective March 1st;
Source: Portaria 567/2006 of June 12th, effective August 1st.
The mean age of patients in the pair of DRGs, m age pair, was calculated as the
mean age of all patients coded with the DRGs that correspond to each pair, for
each pair of DRGs, hospital and year. For the mean age of patients in the DRGs
with and without complication of each pair, m age cc and m age sc was calculated
following the same logic. Furthermore, other auxiliary variables that control for
the percentage of female and number of days that patients stayed in the hospital
were also calculated. The number of discharged patients per year (dp), occupied
beds (beds), case mix index (cmi), length of stay (lstay) and cost, the hospital
characteristics variables, were obtained from hospitals or ACSS reports.
The dependent variable fractionpit is the percentage of the total patients coded
11DRG prices are described in the web appendix at
https://sites.google.com/site/giseletbraun/research.
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in the DRG with complications in each pair of DRGs, by pair of DRG, hospital,
and year:12
fractionpit ≡
#patients in top code DRGpit
#patients in top code DRG + #patients in bottom code DRGpit
(2.7)
where p indexes the pair of DRG, i indexes the hospital, and t indexes the year.
The relevant equation to be estimated and variants of this equation that will be
detailed in the next section, all follow the form:13
fractionpit = α + ψ1spreadpp × post+ β1m age ccpit + β2m age scpit (2.8)
+φ1p female ccpit + φ2p female scpit + λXi + γHi + δyeart + ε
where the ψ vector measures the marginal effect of changes in the variation of price
spread. The β1 and β2 measure the impact of patient’s mean age in the DRGs that
belongs to a pair (same logic for φ). They also work as a control for the (possible)
increase in severity of cases over time. The variable post is a dummy variable
that equals to zero if the observation is from 2003 to 2005 (the new prices are not
applicable for these years), and equals to one otherwise (from 2006 to 2008).
Hospital characteristics coefficients (λ) of dp, beds, cmi, lstay and cost have dif-
ferent relations with the upcoding issue. Discharged patients, length of stay and
cost may or may not be directly associated with upcoding. Whenever upcoding
does not imply a different course of action but merely a distinct classification code
(and the corresponding payment), the observed number of discharged patients,
length of stay and costs will be independent of the extent of upcoding. On the
other hand, if classification of patients into a different DRG leads immediately to
another treatment protocol, yearly average costs per patient treated at the hos-
12In the econometric analysis, the fraction is multiplied by 105
13For the DRG weight analysis (the results are available upon request), the relevant equation
is:
fractionpit = α+ ψ2spreadwp × post+ β1m age ccpit + β2m age scpit + φ1p female ccpit
+φ2p female scpit + λXi + γHi + δyeart + ε
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pital level are positively associated with the extent of upcoding. The number of
beds that a hospital has is usually defined in the construction phase, or posterior
adjustments take place at spaced intervals of time. It is unlikely to be correlated
contemporaneously with upcoding. A different situation occurs for the cmi. The
computation of this index is based on the DRG episodes of each hospital. System-
atic upcoding also creates an upward pressure in the cmi. However, the final index
value is computed normalizing the average national value to the unit value. Com-
mon upgrading to all hospitals does not necessarily change the relative position of
each hospital. Nonetheless, it potentially is an endogenous variable.
The δ vector of coefficients can be interpreted as the mean impact of the price
changes on all pairs (similar interpretation to γ).
Estimation of the coefficients is done using panel data, considering fixed-effects at
the level of DRG pairs (hospital fixed-effects were also computed). To correct for
potential autocorrelation and clusters, robust standard errors clustered at DRG
pairs were computed.
A different analysis is performed to assess the role of age in the potential upcoding
behavior. Suppose that older patients are on average more complex cases and
remember that upcoding means moving some of the more complex cases from the
lower DRG to the top DRG. Given the association of age with case complexity, this
means moving some of the older patients from the bottom DRG to the top DRG,
in which they will belong to the youngest within that DRG. Thus, average age of
patients in both DRGs decreases and there is upcoding, under the assumption of
positive association between case complexity and age of patient. In other words,
we want to ask the following question: “do hospitals upcode taking into account
the age of the patients?” Hence, we define:
d age ccpit = m age ccpit −m age pairpit (2.9)
d age scpit = m age scpit −m age pairpit (2.10)
where the dependent variables measure the difference between the mean age of
patients coded in the DRG with complications (without complications) and the
mean age in the pair of DRGs, for each pair, hospital and year. These two variables
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are then used to estimate the coefficients of the following equations:
d age ccpit = α + λXi + γHi + δyeart + ε (2.11)
d age scpit = α + λXi + γHi + δyeart + ε (2.12)
where the years range from 2001 to 2008.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Initial results
The estimates show no statistical significance of the spread variation on the share
of patients in the top DRG (model 1) at 5% significance level, even though there
is statistical significance at the 10% level. The overall average effect cannot be
interpreted as clear effect from upcoding, though the dummy variables after 2005,
which coincide with the years of price changes, are statistically significant.14 The
estimated coefficient of spread has positive sign, implying that larger price changes
are associated with a stronger share of patients in the top DRG.
Table 2.3: Partial estimation results: basic models
Ind. var. model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
spreadp post 0.643* 0.636* 0.557* 0.829*** 0.831***
(0.335) (0.335) (0.317) (0.303) (0.303)
m age pair 595.9*** 601.5*** 537.6***
(34.29) (34.23) (33.08)




m age cc 90.79*** 89.44***
(18.21) (18.30)
m age sc 142.9*** 143.0***
(22.68) (23.05)
p female cc 466.1
14See the complete result in the appendix.
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(546.6)
p female sc 103.2
(789.3)
Constant 21,325*** 23,045*** 17,617*** 32,488*** 32,180***
(5,896) (6,009) (5,939) (7,143) (7,161)
Obs 29,747 29,747 29,747 23,754 23,754
R-squared 0.166 0.167 0.214 0.152 0.152
Number of pair drg 112 112 112 112 112
Dependent variable: fraction100.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Year dummies and fixed effects at DRG pairs.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The number of discharged patients, beds and cost are negatively correlated with
the fraction of patients in the top DRG, whereas the opposite is true for case-mix
index and length of stay in most of the models.15 It is worthwhile to highlight
the coefficient sign associated with cost, which is negative, meaning that higher-
cost hospitals tend to have a smaller fraction of patients coded in the DRG with
complications than lower-cost hospitals.
Model 2 is the same as model 1 with the addition of gender control. There is
still no evidence of upcoding. The same applies in model 3, where the variable
totdays pair, which accounts for the mean number of days stayed in the hospital,
is included. This variable has the potential to be endogenous, considering that
patients coded in the top DRG, with complications, are supposed to stay more
days in the hospital. Taking this potential endogeneity into consideration, plus
the fact that the results remain unchanged in model 3, the variable totdays pair
will not be used further.
Different from Dafny (2005), the age of the patients has a very important role in
the upcoding process. From graphical analyses, which will be done later in the
section, it is observed that the mean age of patients in the top and bottom DRGs
of a pair have different patterns that must be considered. Model 4 then has the
mean age of patients in the top and bottom DRGs, for each pair of DRGs, as
explanatory variables. The estimation shows evidence of upcoding behavior as the
15Larger hospitals are the ones that have a higher technological differentiation that may not
be fully captured by the case-mix index.
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coefficient of the variable spreadp post is statistically significant.16 In model 5,
we also add the percentage of female in the top and bottom DRGs of each pair
and the results remain roughly equal.17 Referring back to equation 2.2, it becomes
clear that age is an important driver of proportion of patients in the top DRG of
a pair.
It is worthwhile to offer an example of the impact of the spread of prices in the
share of patients coded in the DRG with complications. Consider the specific pair
of DRGs (pair 22) that refers to simple pneumonia and pleurism, with and without
medical complications. Suppose that the Government set hypothetical new DRG
prices that results in e100 increase in spread, which induces upcoding behavior.18
In this particular case, it was found that 20 extra episodes would be included in
the top DRG, in one year, with associated upcoding cost of e12,045.
Table 2.4: Upcoding size and cost - the case of the DRG pair 22
t=0 t=1
Mean number of cases (from sample, by year) 24,835 24,835 Upcoding (number of cases) 20
Marginal effect of price spread 0.831 0.831 Top DRG price (2006) e1,742
Fraction100 0.1893 0.1901 Bottom DRG price (2006) e1,139
N of cases in the top DRG 4,701 4,721 Spread of prices e602
N of cases in the bottom DRG 20,134 20,114 Cost of upcoding e12,045
Mean number of cases, 24, 835, is the total number of episodes in DRG pair 22, 198, 681, divided by 8, the number of years.
Fraction100 at t=0: 0.1893, the sample value.




e100 (102) is the hypothetical increase in spread.
The 105 is the number by which the observed fraction was transformed for the regressions.
As previously mentioned, the distinction between pure public hospitals, SPA, and
more private-management like hospitals, EPE, is potentially important. We test
for it allowing time dummies and the marginal incentive to upcode to be different
according to the statute type of the hospital. The two groups of hospitals do not
16The estimations were performed considering the fixed effects at the level of DRG pairs.
Robustness check altering the fixed effects from the DRG pairs to hospital level reveals the
strenght of the results, that remain mainly unchanged. The full set of regressions are available
upon request.
17The analysis using spreadw (the changes in weights of the DRGs) presents results that are
similar to the price changes and they are available at https://sites.google.com/site/giseletbraun/.
18The e100 was defined in a way to represent an almost 10% increase in the average spread
of prices in 2006, which was e1,128 (this average was calculated from the difference between the
top and bottom DRGs in all 112 DRG pairs included in the sample).
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behave differently in the upcoding matter. In the model, there is an intercept
term for EPE hospitals, and the variable spread postEPE allows the measure of
marginal incentive for upcoding to be different between hospital statutes. None is
statistically significant. Therefore, we conclude that there is no difference in this
aspect between the two sets of hospitals. The incentive for upcoding is, according
to these results, independent of the juridic nature of hospitals.19
Other potential changes in the upcoding results were analyzed. In particular, we
considered the possibility of upcoding under the distinction of having medical or
surgical pair of DRGs, and also the possibility of upcoding subjected to two differ-
ent scenarios where there is negative or positive spread of prices. The possibility
of asymmetric exposure to DRG price change could be relevant, with upcoding
appearing more easily with DRG price increases (the DRG price decrease should
be linked to a “downcoding”). There was no modification in the main conclu-
sions. These factors were not statistically significant.20 They constitute robustness
checks.21
Another important question relates to the cases of patients’ transfer between hos-
pitals. We constructed an index to measure the complexity of the cases transferred
in and out of each hospital and the received cases (transfer in) showed to be sta-
tistically significant, meaning that the higher the complexity of cases received by
a hospital the higher is the share of patients coded in the top DRG, which was
naturally expected.22
2.6.2 A longer term view
An important issue to be addressed is whether the current upcoding trend is a
long term historical trend or it started with the price changes of DRGs in 2003.
Previously, we addressed only the 2006 price change, which may just reinforce a
19The partial result is presented in the appendix.
20The exception is the model that accounts for differences between the type of DRG, being it
a medical or surgical one. In this case, the upcoding effect was not identified.
21Another model specification, with results not presented here, allows for different hospital
upcoding behavior depending on the size of activity. There was no change in the results as
the high and low volume hospital regressions show evidence of upcoding without remarkable
differences between them.
22Results are available upon request.
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change that already resulted from a 2003 price change.
Using the simplest regression models, without the impact of DRG price changes
and adding two initial years to the previous regressions, we find that years 2001-
2003 seem to be somewhat different than the others. The same behavior is observed
for the models that include the DRG price changes plus two initial years. The
magnitude of the coefficients are bigger after 2003, but much bigger after 2006,
coinciding with the time of DRG price changes. Hence, the first price changes that
occurred in 2003 may have created some incentives for upcoding, but another shift
seems to take place in 2006, with the latest change in DRG relative prices.
Table 2.5: Long term impact: year dummies
Year model 4 - spreadp post model 5 - spreadp post model 4 model 5
2001 reference reference reference reference
2002 559.4 560.0 554.1 554.6
2003 831.6 827.9 834.6 830.8
2004 1,099 1,098 1,099 1,097
2005 1,070 1,069 1,062 1,060
2006 1,755 1,756 2,393 2,393
2007 1,978 1,975 2,618 2,614
2008 2,314 2,313 2,958 2,956
2.6.3 Age effects
Age can be a discriminating variable that is associated with episode complexity,
as previously argued. To assess its role in the upcoding, we need to consider the
average age in the top DRG and the average age in the bottom DRG.
Figure 2.1 shows the growth rate of the average age in the pairs of DRGs. Even
at this aggregate level, a couple of empirical facts are worth noting. First, the
evolution before and after 2006 seems to be distinct. In the first years of the
sample, average age within each pair of DRGs is increasing but at an intermediate
rate between the top DRG growth rate of patients’ average age and the bottom
DRG growth rate. However, since 2006, we observe a clear shift toward average
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age at the DRG-pair level increasing faster than in the bottom and the top DRGs
(except for 2008). This can only result from a composition change, characterized
by a slower growth in average age of both DRGs caused by older patients in the
bottom DRG (which has a lower average age) moving to the top DRG (where they
will be relatively young patients).
Figure 2.1: Growth rate of average age
Table 2.6: Average age of patients
Year DRG pair Top DRG Bottom DRG
2001 56.44 62.06 53.56
2002 56.64 62.36 53.68
2003 57.07 62.89 54.06
2004 57.39 63.17 54.32
2005 57.67 63.62 54.68
2006 57.98 63.63 54.79
2007 59.31 64.55 55.93
2008 59.76 65.28 56.26
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If age is associated with high complexity and it is used as a lead signal to how severe
it will be the case, a change in the criterion for inclusion of younger ages in the
top DRG would result in an testable empirical prediction. In case that upcoding
takes more patients but less complicated cases to the top DRG, and assuming age
to be positively correlated to severity of the case, then we should observe average
age decreasing in both DRGs of the pair. The alternative hypothesis is that the
patient mix has worsen over time, implying that average age of patients increases
over time in both DRGs of each pair, and in a way unrelated to the change in
DRG prices.
Thus, the two hypotheses have different implications to the coefficient of interest.
We are interested in the overall trend of average age in the top and the bottom
DRGs of the pairs, and in the marginal effect associated with the magnitude of
the price change. The hypothesis of worst cases leads to a positive trend over time
in both top and bottom DRG and statistically non-significant coefficient of price
change. The upcoding hypothesis implies a negative trend of the mean age in the
top DRG and a positive trend in the bottom DRG, reinforced by price sensitivity
- a more pronounced effect is expected when relative prices change more.
In the appendix, table 2.10 shows the estimates related to the role of age. Taking
first the results for the top DRG within each pair, we observe that the difference
is negative for all years with exception of 2002, though it is statistically non-
significant in most of the cases. Statistically significant effects occur only from
2006 onwards, with the average age in top DRG decreasing relative to the average
age in pair. For the bottom DRG, a different picture emerges, as the difference
over time decreases only in 2002 and 2006, but being statistically non-significant
in all years. It means that average age within the bottom DRG is evolving at a
smaller pace than average across the pairs of DRGs in 2002 and 2006 (the opposite
happens for the remaining years).23
Taking both results together, we have support to the basic fact evidence in figure
2.1. Such evidence is consistent with the presence of upcoding.
23The regressions including the change in relative prices from 2003 to 2008 do not improve
the results. They are available by request.
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If the role of age were not to provide conclusive evidence of upcoding, another
variables that try to capture the severity of the disease could be investigated in the
same way. We could have worked with number of medical diagnoses or procedures.
At first, it is expected that patients coded in the bottom DRG present smaller
number of medical diagnoses or procedures. However, it could be the case that
these variables are taken into consideration when deciding to upcode a patient.
This would contribute to hide evidence of upcoding in the data.24
2.6.4 Upcoding size and cost
We estimated the total upcoding size and cost, considering the same hypothetical
increase of e100 in the DRGs spread of prices, as done for DRG pair 22, this time
for the full set of episodes. The results are summarized in the next table.
Table 2.7: Upcoding size and cost - all DRG pairs
t=0 t=1
Mean number of cases (by year) 384,615 384,615 Upcding (number of cases) 308
Marginal effect of price spread 0.831 0.831 top DRG price (2006) e3,366
Fraction100 0.3797 0.3895 bottom DRG price (2006) e2,138
N of cases in the top DRG 146,038 146,346 spread of price e1,228
N of cases in the bottom DRG 238,577 238,269 Cost of upcoding e377,815
Mean number of cases, 384, 615, is the total number of episodes in all DRG pairs, 3, 076, 921, divided by 8, the number of years.
Fraction100 at t=0: 0.3797, the sample value.




e100 (102) is the hypothetical increase in spread.
The 105 is the number by which the observed fraction was transformed for the regressions.
An increase of e100 in the spread of prices would lead to a bigger fraction of
patients to be coded in the top DRG. The mean value of the share of patients
coded in the top DRG would change from 37.97% to 38.05%. Multiplying the mean
number of DRG episodes in the year by these shares and taking the difference
between the two values gives the total number of upcoded cases that would be
coded in the top DRG, following the incentive of price spread increase.
24Another consideration to deepen the investigation of upcoding would be to use the chronic
conditions of the patients as an incentive for upcoding. In this case, the unit of observation
would need to be the patient and a probabilistic model of whether the patient would be coded
in the top DRG or not could be defined. The data used here does not allow for this type of
analysis, but we mention it as a suggestion.
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Supposing that all hypothetical upcoded cases would have a cost that equals the
mean cost of all top code DRG prices, e3,366, the upcoded cases would represent
an extra cost of e377,815 in a given year.
2.7 Final remarks
Previously, it was found that US hospitals were quick to react to DRG price
changes, and to profit considerably from upcoding (Dafny, 2005). Classifying
patients in those DRGs that allowed for a higher payment, and doing so more
when the favorable price change was stronger, provided evidence for upcoding.
A natural issue is whether upcoding is specific to the US or it can be found
in other health systems as well. This question is particularly important as many
countries over the last decade introduced patient classification systems. Purchasers
of health care, being them Governments (through NHSs or sickness funds) or
health insurance companies, are increasingly using patient classification systems
for providers’ payment.
We use data from a NHS with the following features: demand to each hospital is
basically exogenous, as patients have to comply with Government-defined catch-
ment areas for each hospital; hospitals have to classify patient episodes into a
DRG-like system; hospitals are not paid on an episode-by-episode basis but yearly
budgets have been increasingly based on the DRGs and the DRG mix the hospital
provides; DRG prices are set by Government ruling and have infrequent changes,
and the background studies supporting the new prices are not known to hospitals.
Thus, price changes can be seen as exogenous from the point of view of hospitals.
Our results provide a mild support for upcoding, which can be described by an
increase in the share of top DRG within pairs of DRGs. It has increased over
time (2001-2008), and more so in recent years. Moreover, not only upcoding has
been occurring above what would be predicted by the simple ageing of population
(assumed to be captured by the average age of patients), but has been more
important when the price change was stronger. This points to the conclusion
that even within national health services, management of hospitals does respond
to incentives for upcoding patients.
Given such result, it is recommended another review of prices and weights of the
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DRGs to try to avoid such harmful scheme of upcoding, which is not consequence of
a sicker population but a way to increase budget from Government to hospitals. In
any case, it is not said that the money coming from upcoding is not being invested
to increase quantity or quality of services in the health care units. However, a
clear necessity of extra budget to cover the expenditure of health care must be
negotiated explicitly between hospitals and third-party payers in order to avoid
unequal access of the population to health care, which is quite possible (assuming





Table 2.8: Estimation results: basic models
Ind. Var. model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
spreadp post 0.643* 0.636* 0.557* 0.829*** 0.831***
(0.335) (0.335) (0.317) (0.303) (0.303)
m age pair 595.9*** 601.5*** 537.6***
(34.29) (34.23) (33.08)




m age cc 90.79*** 89.44***
(18.21) (18.30)
m age sc 142.9*** 143.0***
(22.68) (23.05)
p female cc 466.1
(546.6)
p female sc 103.2
(789.3)
dp -0.373*** -0.379*** -0.319** -0.194* -0.193*
(0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.116) (0.116)
beds -1.513 -1.435 -2.502 0.341 0.327
(2.340) (2.320) (2.157) (2.084) (2.082)
cmi 3,431* 3,380* 4,350** 1,692 1,704
(1,997) (1,984) (1,992) (1,601) (1,601)
lstay 316.3 301.7 -67.42 -38.71 -35.13
(311.7) (310.9) (313.5) (221.4) (221.4)
cost -535,532* -549,635* -402,478 -94,002 -91,031
(285,172) (284,688) (288,626) (244,791) (245,609)
yeard4 581.5 615.2 676.8 619.5 618.5
(483.3) (483.8) (498.6) (384.4) (384.5)
yeard5 254.9 298.1 362.9 580.7 579.0
(544.8) (541.6) (553.1) (427.7) (427.5)
yeard6 1,610*** 1,639*** 1,661*** 1,822*** 1,824***
(607.6) (606.9) (602.9) (499.2) (499.6)
yeard7 1,609*** 1,643*** 1,908*** 2,188*** 2,186***
(581.9) (583.1) (569.5) (522.8) (524.3)
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.8 continued
yeard8 2,098*** 2,137*** 2,316*** 2,541*** 2,536***
(733.9) (731.0) (690.5) (595.7) (596.0)
Constant 21,325*** 23,045*** 17,617*** 32,488*** 32,180***
(5,896) (6,009) (5,939) (7,143) (7,161)
Obs 29,747 29,747 29,747 23,754 23,754
R-squared 0.166 0.167 0.214 0.152 0.152
Number of pair drg 112 112 112 112 112
Dependent variable: fraction100.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Fixed effects at DRG pairs.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Alternative regression models
Table 2.9: Estimation results: alternative models
Ind. Var. EPE - SPA Med - Surg Asymmetry









Constant 30,957*** 32,205*** 32,191***
(7,236) (7,154) (7,162)
Obs 23,754 23,754 23,754
R-squared 0.153 0.152 0.152
Number of pair drg 112 112 112
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Year dummies and fixed effects at pair drg.
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The analysis of age
Table 2.10: Estimation results: age effects models



















Number of pair DRG 112 112
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Does it last? Effects from a public
policy to recover waiting lists
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Abstract
Waiting lists generate policy interest in several countries. We often observe specific
public programmes directing funds in an attempt to solve the problem. Incentives
are a key element. Using data from Portuguese public hospitals we show that tem-
porary funds, in a time and budget-delimited programme, had temporary effects
on supply the side of health care.
The number of patients on the waiting list for first ophthalmology appointment
and subsequent surgery has increased over the years in the Portuguese public
health system. The ophthalmology intervention programme was designed to reduce
patients’ waiting list and waiting time to receive cataract and other eye-related
surgeries. The programme induced an increase in the supply of medical procedures
and a reduction in the waiting time to receive care during the implementation of




Managing waiting lists is of high concern in several countries with public health
service. Waiting time to receive medical care can be quite long. For instance,
waiting time for surgical procedures such as hip and knee replacement can be as
long as six months in Spain.1 Waiting lists are important to evaluate a national
health system (NHS) as a whole. They are easily judged by the public service
users and reflect results from the combination of investment, productivity and
level of patients’ health. Short-term programmes aimed at reducing waiting lists
by funding extra-activities, have been commonly employed in many European
countries with NHS. Portuguese examples of this kind are the Programa Espećıfico
de Resolução de Lista de Espera, Programa de Promoção de Acesso, and Programa
Especial de Combate às Listas de Espera Cirúrgicas. These programmes were
implemented in the late 1990s and early in the new century but did not reduce
the size of the waiting lists.
Efforts to enhance the Portuguese NHS have continued in more recent years. In
2004 an information system was created, the Sistema Integrado de Gestão de In-
scritos para Cirurgia (SIGIC), with the goal of improving management of waiting
times for consultations and surgical procedures. The indicators related to ophthal-
mological care in Portugal show that its quality is poor when compared with that
of some other developed countries. In some cases, patients wait several months,
or even years, to receive health care.
Reasons for shortage of supply derive from several sources: scarcity of physicians,
low levels of productivity, and bad management are the main factors on the sup-
ply side; whereas ageing population associated with a greater awareness of the
technological developments and facilities available to correct sight problems are
responsible for the constant increase in the demand for health care.
The “ophthalmology intervention programme” (PIO) was designed by a group of
specialized doctors and professors, selected by the Ministry of Health, to implement
actions with the goal of reducing the size of waiting list and waiting time for
ophthalmological care. It is a funding plan with incentives for extra consultations
1Siciliani et al. (2013).
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and surgical procedures, as with the programmes mentioned before, inserted into
a more informative scenario created with the SIGIC. The results show evidence of
the programme’s success to increase volume of activity during the time that the
PIO was carried out. Waiting times to receive care were also influenced by the
PIO, with a reduction observed during and after the programme.
A potential solution to address the excess of demand is to increase the supply
(new Portuguese or foreign physicians). Another possibility is the rearrangement
of human resources and installed capacity, offering the right incentives to increase
performance and ensuring the level of quality in the services provided.
Following an analysis of these alternatives, which have the objective of improv-
ing care in the ophthalmology specialty, it was decided and decreed in Despacho
20639/2008 to create the PIO, which is the subject of evaluation of this study.2
The programme seeks to increase public access to ophthalmological first consulta-
tions and surgical procedures through agreements between NHS and hospitals to
perform extra services that will be paid for with additional PIO funds.
Cataract is an ophthalmology condition that can drastically reduce the patients’
quality of life, and can lead to blindness if not adequately treated. According to
Portaria 1306/2008, the NHS performed around 600,000 medical appointments
and 60,000 surgeries in the year 2007, which resulted in a waiting list for cataract
surgery of about 30,000 people and mean waiting time of 3.8 months on December
31st of the same year.3
There are two publicly available evaluations of PIO’s performance. One was con-
ducted by Administração Central do Sistema de Saúde (ACSS) and the other by
the Tribunal de Contas of Portugal.4 The analysis of ACSS is centred on the final
performance of the hospitals (volume of activity) after the PIO’s execution. They
concluded, roughly speaking, that the programme was successful. However, the
Tribunal de Contas evaluated the programme as not satisfactory in reaching the
goals it established.5 Even with these assessments, there is insufficient economic
2Implementation of the PIO also came in response to public pressure.
3Portaria is an administrative act that has the objective of explaining a law’s application in
detail.
4Tribunal de contas is a court that is responsible for the control of the Government’s public
accounts.
5PIO’s objective was 30,000 extra cataract surgeries and 75,000 extra first consultations. The
hospitals agreed on performing 21,055 extra surgeries and 48,075 extra first consultations, but
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evaluation of the PIO.
Our contribution in this paper is to offer a measure of the programme impact,
after controlling for unknown factors that might have also induced its success or
failure.
The results reveal a statistically significant impact of the PIO on the volume of
first consultations and eye-related surgical procedures and also on the mean waiting
time for these health care services. Furthermore, there is a longer term impact of
the programme on mean waiting time to receive medical care.
This paper is organized in 6 sections. Section 2 gives the contextualization of the
programme in time and the literature review on the subject. Section 3 describes
the PIO with details of implementation and accomplishments. Section 4 explains
the methodology used. Section 5 shows the results and Section 6 presents the final
remarks.
3.2 Portuguese scenario and other countries’ ex-
periences
According to the Portuguese National Health Plan 2004-2010, there was an increase
in the incidence of eye-related diseases and during this period no adequate measure
was taken to reverse this trend.6 The plan also highlighted the need for strategic
orientation and interventions, which were implemented through the PIO after the
release of the publication.
In general, intervention programmes can be classified as horizontal or vertical, as
defined in Sena et al. (2006). Horizontal programmes usually connect services of-
fered at the same level. The strategies of interventions tend to be designed for the
long run and are usually implemented in countries with more stable Governments.7
In contrast, vertical programmes are designed to address a specific problem, es-
tablishing direct actions to provide health care, and are more frequent in countries
execution rates were 59% for extra surgeries and 41% for extra first consultations. See Auditoria
PIO (2010).
6The complete report of the plan can be found in PNS (2004).
7The connection of family plan and vaccine programme is an example of horizontal pro-
gramme.
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with less stable Governments and more financial problems and, for this reason,
have shorter scope and time of execution.8
The literature reports ways to match supply and demand of eye-related medical
care. On the supply side the main mechanisms applied are increasing productivity
of public hospitals, increasing capacity, and the change of incentives. In order to
manage demand size, the options include prioritization of patients with greater
need and encouragement of private health insurance through subsidization.
There are several problems that should be considered when trying to increase the
supply of medical services. If productivity is increased through the funding of extra
activity, dynamic problems may arise: the perception of higher productivity could
lead to higher demand. Increasing supply by increasing the number of physicians
takes time and may not be successful. In fact, some years are needed to educate
them, and the success of this measure also depends on the behaviour of the demand
during this period. Another, more immediate option, is to expand supply by
sending patients to receive medical care in the private sector and paying for their
treatment. This measure has the additional advantage of increasing competition
between public and private hospitals. Its success in addressing the problem will
depend on whether or not supply from public and private hospitals combined is
enough to cover total demand.
The strategy most widely used in European countries to shorten waiting times is to
increase supply through increased activity inside hospitals, as explained in Hurst
and Siciliani (2003) and Siciliani et al. (2013). However, this type of measure does
not appear to be effective in the long run and waiting times are still a concern in
some NHS.
The case of Spain has similarities to Portugal’s situation. Their NHS is publicly
funded, past expenditure and case mix index are used to define the financing
of the system, and waiting times are more or less equal to those in Portugal.
A difference is that patients are free of charge at the point of delivery of care,
which reduces the possibility of solving the problem through demand-side. The
main strategies adopted in Spain were imposing a “guarantee of maximum waiting
time”, a measure which had no impact since the limit was over the maximum
8An example of vertical plan is the coordination of actions between hospital level and primary
care level to control a given disease.
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observed in the hospitals for most of the cases; “increase in working hours”, which
failed partially because of reduced productivity of physicians; “massive referrals
to private providers”, which increased the expenditure dramatically and could not
be sustained in the long run; “specific funding for procedures with highest waiting
time”, which led policy makers to concentrate efforts on one part of the problem
only and did not provide incentives to solve the general system problem; and the
development of “out-patient care centres”. This latter measure presented visible
benefits in reduction of waiting times, but also attracted more patients to the
NHS, which increased waiting lists. Another difference is that the political and
administrative division of Spain into autonomous communities reduces incentives
for the implementation of a national health plan, as in Portugal.
Italy is another European country that is working to reduce waiting lists inside
on NHS. Its decentralized system, with 19 regions and 2 autonomous provinces,
shows geographical disparities that are reflected in the health care of each part of
the country. Hospital remuneration is achieved through a prospective and activity-
based system for in-patient and out-patient care. For in-patient care remuneration
is determined according to diagnosis-related groups (DRG) and for out-patient
care, by a fee-for-service basis. Physicians have a base salary that is augmented
with performance-related payments. These characteristics contribute to the prob-
lem of long waiting lists and waiting times with the exception of in-patient care,
which has waiting lists at acceptable levels. Out-patient care and diagnostic tests,
on the other hand, have waiting lists that need to be reduced.
The direct policies adopted in Italy to address these problems were: “maximum
waiting time target”, which had no real impact because there was no control or
penalties for failure; “data collection improvement”; the creation of a “unified
booking centre”; measures that could be categorized as “demand-side policies”
(priority groups definition, diagnostic and therapeutic pathway, penalties for no-
show patients); measures that could be categorized as “supply-side policies” (in-
crease of supply capacity by specific agreements, purchase of extra visits, and
tests from private providers). Some of the indirect policies adopted include co-
payments, intramoenia private practice, and promotion of voluntary health insur-
ance coverage.9 Finally, the country released its National Health Plan 2010-12, a
9Intramoenia is the private health care provided in public health structures.
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plan similar to the one designed in Portugal. This plan included some practices to
reduce waiting lists such as updates on maximum waiting times, levels of priority
and respective waiting times, and efforts to improve the collection and publication
of waiting times data.
In Portugal, the measures adopted in the specific plan to reduce ophthalmology
waiting lists are not an innovation at all, given that they were implemented in one
form or another in countries such as Spain and Italy. The PIO could be classified
as a vertical programme with supply-side interventions through the use of extra-
activity funding, combined with maximum waiting time guarantees (details in the
next section).
The importance of evaluating public programmes, such as the PIO, is stressed in
the literature, where the elaboration of evaluation reports is recommended . These
reports are not always produced in practice.10 In the case of the PIO, reports were
produced but they do not benefit from the economic techniques used in this study.
3.3 The ophthalmology intervention programme
The size of waiting lists and waiting time is a serious problem in the Portuguese
NHS. There are some specialties, such as ophthalmology, for which the indicators
are not compatible with the quality of service that NHS is committed to provide.
The mean waiting time for medical procedures comprehended in the programme
fell sharply during the period analysed.11 Similar data using only information
from hospitals that formally adopted the programme were summarized in a report
produced by the Tribunal de Contas and the same reduction in waiting time is
observed.
The waiting time for eye-related surgery in 2006 was, on average, 5 months. By
2010 average waiting time had fallen to less than 2 months. External factors could
have influenced this result, but still the intervention programme might have been
the main driver of this improvement.
The intervention programme established a contractual agreement of 30,000 surg-
10See Sena et al. (2006).
11The mean waiting time was 153, 129, 89, 68, and 47 days in 2006 to 2010, respectively. This
data is for complete cases only , that is, patients who entered and left the waiting list.
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eries in addition to those set annually by hospitals, and of 75,000 extra medical
appointments, from July 1st, 2008 through July 1st, 2009. This was stipulated in
the Portaria 1306/2008.
The PIO is also called Plano de Acesso à Cirurgia Oftalmológica (PACO) and
hereinafter the two terms are used interchangeably. The measures contemplated
in the plan are: a) a contractual agreement to implement extra activities in each
hospital; b) to increase the base production of the hospitals according to the in-
stalled capacity; c) to define some hospitals as top-performance centres for cataract
surgery (Centro de Elevado Desempenho (CED)); and d) to include public hospi-
tals in the CED. The medical procedures comprehended in the PIO are those with
ICD9-MC codes that relate to ophthalmology procedures.12.
The limit waiting time for cataract surgery was set at 5 months and 10 days. When
the limit is reached, the patient must be admitted for surgery. If no appointment
is assigned after 4 months (75% of the maximum time), the patient can be trans-
ferred, in the following order: first, for a Hospital Público de Destino (HPD) that
belongs to the CED; second, to an HPD that does not belong to the CED; third,
the surgery is paid for by the Government, to be performed in a private health
unit that belongs to the network previously defined.13 If the patient does not wish
to be transferred, he is once more included in the waiting list and the waiting time
resets.14 For first medical appointment, the limit time is 2 months.
Table 3.1 describes the actions taken by the Government to implement the PIO in
chronological order, as well as the evaluations conducted by ACSS and Tribunal
de Contas and the results achieved by the programme.
Table 3.1: Regulation and evaluation of the PIO
Institution Type Number Date Year Goals
Ministry of Health Order 28478 Nov, 5th 2007 assign a group to analyse the alter-
natives to reduce differences in sup-
ply and demand for consultations
and surgeries of ophthalmology
Ministry of Health Order 20639 Jul, 25th 2008 create the PIO
continued on next page
12ICD9-MC refers to “International Classification of Diseases-Medical Codes”
13See an illustration in figure 3.4.
14Regulated by Ministry of Health, 2008, Portarias 45 and 1306.
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Ministry of Health Administrative
measure
1306 Oct, 22th 2008 define the dates, procedures, and
specific rules of the PIO
ACSS Regulatory
instruction
10 Aug, 8th 2008 establish the hospital’s actions to




1 Feb, 11th 2009 clarify the articles of the contract
between Government and hospitals
to perform the PIO
ACSS Evaluation 1 Sep, 30th 2008 goals reached in the first quarter of
the programme
ACSS Evaluation 2 Dec, 31st 2008 goals reached in the first semester
of the programme
ACSS Evaluation 3 Dec, 16th 2009 goals reached in the whole period of
the programme
Audit Court Report 48 Dec, 16th 2010 evaluate the financial and social im-
pact of the programme
Notes:
(a) extra medical appointment result by the end of the PIO: + 80,940;
(b) extra surgery result by the end of the PIO: + 36,446.
The analyses performed by ACSS can be classified as descriptive statistics and the
one conducted by the Tribunal de Contas has a more administrative approach.
Both are important but insufficient from the economic point of view to assess the
health benefits from the public health spending.
The evaluation of the programme will be enriched with our analysis, which uses
inferential statistics, given the problem of modelling variables that are subjected
to random variations (this is the reason why the descriptive statistics alone could
misrepresent the facts obtained from the data in the available reports). Another
important contribution of our analysis comes from the fact that it is not an admin-
istrative view, which would usually concentrate the auditing effort on a pre-defined
set of variables. We believe that policy decisions (such as the decision for a new
intervention programme) would be better informed if there were an economic anal-




The data used in this paper include information of DRG episodes and com-
pleted surgical procedures cases.15 The national dataset of DRGs records med-
ical episodes of all Portuguese public hospitals.16 It was primarily designed for
administrative purposes and the patients were de-identified before being used in
the study. The information is provided by the hospitals and is organized by the
Administração Central do Sistema de Saúde, I.P. (ACSS). Some disadvantages,
such as lack of information regarding the waiting time to receive medical care,
explain the necessity of using another dataset where this information is available.
Completed surgical procedures cases are recorded in the national Lista de Inscritos
para Cirurgia (LIC), also organized by the ACSS in the Unidade Central de Gestão
de Inscritos para Cirurgia (UCGIC).
Since no patient identifier was provided, due to data confidentiality reasons, it has
not been possible to merge the two datasets. Therefore, two parallel analyses have
been implemented. On one hand, the volume of surgeries is evaluated by using
information from the DRG dataset, which allows us to use records of surgeries at
the disaggregated level of procedure codes. On the other hand, the study of waiting
time is performed considering the DRG, a more aggregated level of information.
Since the analysis is performed across a heterogeneous set of hospitals, character-
istics of each hospital unit were collected from regular reports from ACSS and/or
hospitals. The information collected includes proxies to medical activity, complex-
ity of the cases treated, installed capacity and cost (aggregation is annual for each
hospital).
The sample size of the DRG dataset relevant to our objectives is 2,635 monthly
observations of 68 hospital units from 2006 to 2010.17 The selected procedures
15Complete cases are those in which there is information of both the date that a patient was
indicated for a surgical procedure and the date of the procedure itself.
16DRG definition and Portuguese DRGs are discussed in Busse et al. (2011).
17This is the number of Portuguese hospital units that recorded at least 1 medical procedure
out of the 19 ICD9-MC procedure codes comprehended in the PIO, which does not correspond
to the total number of hospital units in the country.
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defined in the PIO by Portaria 1306/2008 of the Ministry of Health are the fol-
lowing: 1311, intracapsular extraction of lens by temporal inferior route; 1319,
other intracapsular extraction of lens; 132, extracapsular extraction of lens by lin-
ear extraction technique; 133, extracapsular extraction of lens by simple aspiration
(and irrigation) technique; 1341, phacoemulsification and aspiration of cataract;
1342, mechanical phacofragmentation and aspiration of cataract by posterior route;
1343, mechanical phacofragmentation and other aspiration of cataract; 1351, ex-
tracapsular extraction of lens by temporal inferior route; 1359, other extracapsular
extraction of lens; 1364, discission of secondary membrane (after cataract); 1365,
excision of secondary membrane (after cataract); 1366, mechanical fragmentation
of secondary membrane (after cataract); 1369, other cataract extraction; 1370,
insertion of pseudophakos, not otherwise specified; 1371, insertion of intraocular
lens prosthesis at time of cataract extraction, one-stage; 1372, secondary inser-
tion of intraocular lens prosthesis; 138, removal of implanted lens; 1390, operation
on lens, not elsewhere classified; and 1391, implantation of intraocular telescope
prosthesis.
The subsample of the LIC relevant to our study consists of 2,805 monthly observa-
tions from 54 hospitals.18 It is larger than the DRG dataset, as expected, because
the sample is selected based on DRGs, which can combine more than one ICD9-
MC procedure. We selected all DRGs that belong to the major diagnostic category
(MDC) that corresponds to eye-related DRGs, which are: 36, retinal procedures;
37, orbital procedures; 38, primary iris procedures; 39, lens procedures with or
without vitrectomy; 40, extraocular proc exc orbit, age > 17; 41, extraocular proc
exc orbit, age 0-17; 42, intraocular proc exc retina, iris and lens; 43, hyphema;
44, acute major eye infections; 45, neurological eye disorders; 46, other disorders
of the eye, age > 17 with complication; 47, other disorders of the eye, age > 17
without complication; 48, other disorders of the eye, age 0-17; 534, eye procedures
with major complication; 535, eye disorders with major complication.
Information on procedures and DRGs is used to generate the two dependent vari-
18The number of hospitals in this sample is less than the number in the DRGs dataset because
not all Portuguese hospitals recorded a waiting list during the complete period of analysis.
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where h indexes the hospitals; t, the time, which ranges from January, 2006 to
December, 2010 (monthly); and p, which corresponds to the procedure codes de-
scribed above. In other words, the dependent variable measures the volume of
activity that corresponds to the procedures comprehended in the PIO, per month
in each hospital of the sample.
We have chosen the volume of activity as our dependent variable but we could have
selected some other measure, for example, individual quality of treatment induced
by the PIO. One could argue that the latter would be a more accurate measure of
the outcomes of the programme but the datasets available did not provide enough
information to construct such a variable. There is a trade-off between having
a very representative sample with less individualized information and a smaller
sample with specific information regarding the quality of treatment. The decision
made was to use the representative sample of the Portuguese population.
Waiting time is also recorded monthly, with the same indexes as before for hospitals
and time, and it measures the mean waiting time in all DRGs:
mwtimeh,t = mean (waiting time in days)all DRGs (3.2)
The key independent variable, called “PIO”, evaluates the effect of the interven-
tion programme, using information from before, during, and after the period when
the PIO took place, in order to identify any impact as described in Figure 3.1. It
equals 1 for the time when the programme was in place and is defined as follows:
PIOt =
0, if t < 2008m7 ∨ t > 2009m7;1, if t ≥ 2008m7 ∧ t ≤ 2009m7. (3.3)
In order to check whether the intervention had longer impact on volume of surgeries
and waiting time (after the end of the programme), the variable PIOafter is
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Figure 3.1: Time’s range of observations in dataset
defined, which takes the value 1 after the end of the ophthalmology intervention:
PIOaftert =
0, if t ≤ 2009m7;1, otherwise. (3.4)
Other explanatory variables include year dummies and control for severity of the
disease in the LIC analysis by the mean priority of the cases treated in the hospital.
Note that there are some drawbacks to the data. The first is the fact that the
LIC dataset is based on DRG information. It may be the case that we included
episodes of DRGs in the calculation of mean waiting time that do not have any of
the procedures comprehended in the PIO. One of the PIO’s rules is that a patient
waiting for more than a given time to receive care could be transferred to private
hospitals and the Government would pay for the surgery. In this scenario, without
information of private complete cases in the dataset of LIC, the results might be
underestimated. Another problem is the absence of data from the private hospitals
in the DRG dataset, which could alter the results if included.19
A description of the variables is available in the appendix (Table 3.6). Briefly, in
the DRG dataset mean volume of surgical procedures performed by each hospital
in a month is around 200. For the hospitals (annual information) mean number of
occupied beds (beds) is 451, mean number of discharged patients (dp) is 18,023,
length of stay (lstay) is around 7.5 days, the case-mix index (cmi) is 1.05, and
19The inclusion of private data in the DRG dataset would increase the volume of activity and
magnify any potential effect of the programme.
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the mean individual cost (cost2) is about 6,000 euros.20 For each month, the
annual information of these variables is repeated, because it is the only variable
aggregation available. These variables were included because they might affect
the monthly dependent variable even though they are quite stable throughout the
year. For the LIC dataset, mean waiting time (mwtime) is 95 days, whereas the
mean priority of cases (mpriority) is 1.31.21 The hospital characteristic variables
have mean values similar to those of the previous sample.
Table 3.2: Summary of DRG dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
vol srg 2635 200 186 1 1618
beds 2591 451 313 14 1497
dp 2614 18023 11485 364 50128
lstay 2614 7.44 2.76 2.20 33.50
cmi 2508 1.05 0.24 0.65 1.99
cost2 ((totalcost/dp)/106) 2532 0.0065193 0.0035865 0.0030216 0.0377743
Table 3.3: Summary of LIC dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Sd Min Max
mwtime 2805 95.53 73.13 0 560.14
mpriority 2805 1.31 0.38 1 4
beds 2609 465 315 14 1497
dp 2621 18620 11796 364 50128
lstay 2469 7.58 3.05 2.20 33.50
cmi 2514 1.05 0.23 0.65 1.99
cost2 ((totalcost/dp)/106) 2538 0.0065897 0.0036462 0.0032336 0.0377743
20The mean individual cost is the result of annual total cost (reported by the hospitals) divided
by the annual total number of discharged patients.
21Priority ranges from 1 to 4, in decreasing level of urgency.
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3.4.2 Estimation procedures
Hospitals are the unit of observation in both analyses. With this data we construct
two panels, considering the advantages that panel data offer over cross-section
analysis: there are fixed effects at hospital level, because specific characteristics of
the hospitals that do not change over time may influence the relationship of the
dependent variables with the intervention programme that is being evaluated, the
unobserved heterogeneity. Another correction that has to be made in the panel
setting is to consider the potential autocorrelation amongst the error terms of a
unit (hospital).
The decision regarding the specification of individual-level effects of the model was
made based on the Hausman test, which compares the existence of fixed or random
effects in the data. Qur results reject the null hypothesis, which states that the
difference in the estimated coefficients of the models is not systematic under the
assumptions of having fixed or random effects. This result, associated with the
particularities of the Portuguese health system, leads us to fit the model using
fixed-effects that would capture all temporally constant individual-level effects.
The coefficients of interest are estimated according to the specification of the fol-
lowing equations, in which we correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
and include fixed-effects at hospital level:22
vol srgh,t = α + β1trend+ β2(trend× PIOt) + β3(trend× PIOaftert) (3.5)
+δyeart + θχh,t + εh,t
mwtimeh,t = α + γ1trend+ γ2(trend× PIOt) + γ3(trend× PIOaftert) (3.6)
+ψmpriority + φyeart + ρχh,t + εh,t
We expect the signs of the coefficients β2 and β3 to be positive (β2 > 0 and
β3 > 0), meaning that the volume of medical procedures increases during and
after the execution of the intervention programme. For the equation that measures
the impact of the PIO on the mean waiting time, the sign of the programme
22The specification of the model is not a novelty in the literature of programme evaluation,
as discussed in Imbers and Wooldridge (2009).
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coefficients, γ2 and γ3, are expected to be negative, indicating that waiting time
diminishes during and after the PIO. The PIO and PIOafter variables were
multiplied by the trend, which indexes the months in the sample, ranging from 1
to 60.
The differences between the estimated coefficients are relevant for the analysis:
if β3 = 0, then we have only temporary effect; if β3 = β2, the effects are all
permanent; if β3<β2, only part of the programme’s effects are permanent; and if
β3>β2, there are cumulative effects retained even after the end of the programme
(the same logic applies for γ.)
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Overview
The null hypothesis was that a) the ophthalmology intervention programme had
a positive impact on the volume of surgeries and b) a negative effect on the mean
waiting time.
From Figure 3.2 the behaviour of surgeries’ volume over time is clear. The average
number of surgeries increases from a strip of 100 and 150 to the next, which
varies from 150 to 200 surgeries per month. From July, 2008 to July, 2009, we
observe the highest mean volume of surgeries. This coincides with the period
when the programme was active. This can be interpreted as a first evidence of
the intervention programme’s positive impact. From the graphic of waiting time
(Figure 3.3), it is more difficult to make a visual inference, as there is a trend of
decreasing waiting time during the whole period.
3.5.2 Testing the hypotheses
Volume of medical procedures
Although the graph analysis offers insight into the relationship between the inter-
vention programme and the two variables of interest, volume of surgery and waiting
time, it is necessary to go further and apply specific techniques that control for
other measurable and non-measurable factors that may affect the evaluation of the
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Figure 3.2: Surgeries’ volume
programme in the context of a governmental intervention.
The simplest fixed-effects regression shows that PIO has a positive impact on
the mean number of surgeries performed each month by the hospitals (model
1). The results remain valid when we add year dummies (model 2) and hospital
characteristic variables (model 3). This shows us that the PIO had a statistically
significant impact on the number of surgeries performed by hospital. In other
words, it is shown that the number of medical procedures increased in a significant
way during the intervention. However, the same cannot be said for the period after
the intervention (compared to the pre-intervention period). There is no long-term
impact of the programme on the volume of medical procedures.23
23An extension of model 3, with squared root of volume as the dependent variable, which has
a distribution closer to the Normal, shows estimated coefficients that are qualitatively the same
as the crude data and the non-normality of the distribution does not affect the consistency of
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Figure 3.3: Waiting time
All models were corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The Haus-
man test for fixed and random-effects rejects the null hypothesis that both models
are consistent. This, in addition to the characteristics of the Portuguese health
system, allows us to conclude and apply the fixed-effects model.
Waiting time
The second set of analyses evaluates the impact of the intervention programme on
the mean waiting time of the patients that had a complete case of surgery during
the years from 2006 to 2010. Although the results of model A and B indicate
a weak effect of the PIO on the waiting time, this result changes when control
variables are added (models C and D).
the parameters.
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In model D, the estimated coefficients of the PIO have negative signs, as expected,
and this means that the waiting time during and after the period of the programme
was reduced. The variable mpriority, which labels the severity of the disease, has
a statistically significant and negative estimated coefficient, corresponding to the
fact that more complicated cases have a shorter waiting time for surgeries.
Hausman test results favoured the fixed-effects model as the most suitable one,
and corrections of potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation were applied.
Table 3.4: Linear regression (fixed-effects)
Unit of observation: hospital
Dep. var. Volume Waiting time
Model (1) (2) (3) (A) (B) (C) (D)
trend 1.724*** -0.606 -0.709 -1.990*** -1.873*** 2.028*** 1.837***
(0.531) (0.737) (0.780) (0.432) (0.432) (0.431) (0.438)
trendPIO 1.994*** 1.421*** 1.485*** -0.277 -0.287* -0.423*** -0.445***
(0.377) (0.421) (0.450) (0.179) (0.169) (0.123) (0.139)
trendPIOafter 0.175 0.596 0.563 -0.0165 -0.0460 -0.551*** -0.552***
(0.374) (0.397) (0.416) (0.258) (0.252) (0.172) (0.184)
mpriority -42.14*** -39.20*** -37.60***
(7.780) (7.305) (8.057)
Constant 128.4*** 138.3*** -326.8 160.2*** 212.2*** 187.1*** 240.8**
(12.93) (12.58) (239.3) (9.337) (15.38) (13.20) (93.96)
Obs 2,635 2,635 2,473 2,805 2,805 2,805 2,350
R2 0.131 0.154 0.173 0.318 0.357 0.395 0.426
N of hosp 68 68 65 54 54 54 46
Notes:
(a) *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses; fixed effects at hospital level;
(b) models 2 and C include year dummies; models 3 and D include year dummies and hospital characteristics variables.
Simultaneous analysis of volume of medical procedures and waiting time
It is reasonable to suspect that exogenous shocks that affect volume of medical
procedures may also have an impact on the waiting time to receive a medical
procedure. An example of this is the closure of a surgical unit inside a hospital:
besides the fact that the volume of medical procedures would be expected to fall,
it is also reasonable to think that waiting time to receive care would increase. In
order to verify that the estimation method of the coefficients presented above is
correct, we also controlled for these simultaneous shocks, by performing a simul-
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taneous equation method estimation. The results are consistent with the previous
estimation methods: the programme has a short-term positive impact on volume
of medical procedures and it has a short and longer-term impact on waiting time.
Table 3.5: Simultanous equation model
Unit of observation: hospital
Model (1 and B) (2 and C) (3 and D)
Dep. Var. Volume Waiting time Volume Waiting time Volume Waiting time
(supply) (price) (supply) (price) (supply) (price)
trend 2.655*** -1.496*** -0.0875 2.042*** -0.441 1.730***
(0.687) (0.232) (1.617) (0.539) (1.326) (0.539)
trendPIO 1.473*** -0.705*** 1.219* -0.553** 1.388** -0.475**
(0.505) (0.171) (0.673) (0.224) (0.553) (0.225)
trendPIOafter -0.571 -0.528*** 0.393 -0.675** 0.252 -0.577**
(0.525) (0.178) (0.837) (0.279) (0.692) (0.281)
mpriority -18.02*** -15.43*** -16.79***
(4.217) (4.153) (4.266)
Constant 125.5*** 182.8*** 206.7*** 0 199.4*** 19.77
(12.02) (6.585) (68.94) (0) (61.02) (25.72)
Obs 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,958 1,835 1,835
R2 0.065 0.284 0.075 0.312 0.441 0.315
Notes:
(a) *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; standard errors in parentheses;
(b) model (2 and C) includes year dummies; model (3 and D) includes year dummies and hospital characteristics variables.
3.6 Final remarks
The PIO was designed to enhance quality of health care in the specialty of oph-
thalmology. The objective was to address the low performance of some indicators
such as waiting lists and waiting times for first consultation and surgery. Earlier
evaluations are mainly descriptive and do not take advantage of using econometric
techniques to help the analyses.
Our study investigated the impact of the PIO on volume of medical procedures and
waiting time for eye-related diseases. The PIO was successful in increasing volume
of medical procedures and reducing waiting time in the short term. While financial
incentives were active, the results on the supply side reached the expectations. We
also identified some longer-term effect on waiting time. However, a final conclusion
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about the long-term impact of the PIO, in which the results of both increased
medical activity and reduced waiting time are incorporated in the structure of





The scheme of the PIO
Figure 3.4: The steps of the PIOa
11-12-2008 UCGIC 3
Portaria 1306/2008 de 11 de Novembro


















aSource: Portal da Saúde - First quarter evaluation of the PIO
Description of the variables
Table 3.6: Complete description of the variables
Variable Description
beds number of occupied beds (by hospital, by year)
cmi case-mix index (by hospital, by year)
cost annual individual cost (by hospital, by year)
dp number of discharged patients (by hospital, by year)
lstay length of stay, in days (by hospital, by year)
PIO dummy of the intervention programme (by time)
PIO after dummy of post intervention programme (by time)
yeard* dummies of year
Notes:
(a) Case mix index: cmih,t =
∑
DRG (number of equivalent patients)DRG×(DRG weight)DRG
(total number of equivalent patients)
(b) cost = (annual total cost/annual discharged patients)/106
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